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T HE TRADING STAMP as a competitive device has had a sixty-
year history in American retail merchandising, during which time
it fias been ardently praised by many consumers' and bitterly deplored
by most merchants.2 Its highly litigious history reached its apogee in
the early i9oos when the constitutionality of anti-stamp legislation was
debated in the courts of some twenty states.' The resurgent use of these
stamps in recent years, however, has led to new clashes. In 1955, pro-
posals to regulate stamp companies were introduced in twenty-four state
legislatures,4 and this was followed, in 1956, by independent investiga-
tions of the industry by the Federal Trade Commission,5 the United
States Department of Agriculture,6 and the United States Department
of Justice.7 Because of the complexity of the economic issues involved,
and because of the paucity of objective discussion of these issues and their
' Surveys from numerous areas indicate that as many as 5o% of American families
save trading stamps. VREDENBURc, TRADING STAMPS 20 (1956). Other evidence
of the popular appeal of trading stampr is the large vote by which a South Dakota
anti-stamp statute was defeated in a referendum conducted in the 1956 election. See
note 68 infra. There is, however, some indication of consumer lissaiisfaction. In a
poll recently conducted in Miami, Florida, three-fourths of 5,ooo newspaper readers
polled opposed trading stamps. Miami Herald, March 5, 1957, § B, p. x.
'The various retail trade journals are invariably replete with retailer denunciations.
See e.g., The Grocers Guide, XXVI, No. it, March 1956, p. t; Maine State Grocers
Bulletin, Vol. i9, No. 3, Feb.-Mar. 1955, p. 4; The Maryland Grocers' Skirmisher, Vol.
3o, No. 8, Aug. 1955, p. 75 Washington State Food Dealer, Vol. 5z, No. 5, May 1956,
p. I.
3 For a collection of cases involving anti-stamp legislation, see notes 3o and 31 infra.
'See note 66 infra.
'Letter from Herbert L. Propst, Assistant Manager, Washington Branch Office,
Federal Trade Commission to the Duke Bar Journal, Oct. iI, 1956, on file in Duke
Law Library. See note Ito infra.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Do Trading Stapms Affect Food Costs?, Marketing
Research Report No. 14.7, Jan. 1957. (Subsequent departmental reports will disclose
information on other phases of the trading stamp problem.) See note 56 infra.
'The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice is presently
conducting its investigation of stamp operations in the grocery field. The purpose
and scope of its investigation is not known at present. Interview with counsel for The
Sperry & Hutchinson Company, New York City, Jan. 2-4, 1957 (hereinafter cited as
INTERVIEW).
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legal significance, an extended exploration of the trading-stamp problem
and its many ramifications appears appropriate.
The stamp company delivers a "package promotion" to a retailer
under an exclusive franchise for the retailer's type of business within his
"trade area."" This promotion consists of stamps, savings books, the
promise of the company to redeem the stamps with merchandise,' cata-
logues describing the merchandise which may be obtained with the
stamps, plus, perhaps, additional advertising material. The retailer pays
the company an amount of money determined by the number of stamps
he receives, typically ten dollars per 4,000 stamps, or one-quarter of a
cent per stamp,10 which generally approximates the "cash" value assigned
it by the company." The retailer then distributes the stamps to con-
sumers upon purchase of goods at the rate required by the company's
contract, usually no less than one stamp per ten-cent purchase.' 2 When
the purchaser has amassed stamps sufficient to fill his savings book, he
becomes entitled to select merchandise, called hereafter redemption
premiums, either by mail from a catalogue or at a local redemption out-
let maintained by the company. These redemption premiums are
"priced" in terms of the "cash" value of the stamp, ordinarily at the
average price of that commodity in the retail market."3
s The exclusive* franchise agreement is indispensable to the stamp operation, for a
merchant would be reluctant to adopt a stamp plan without the assurance that the
company would not sell stamps to his competitors. See VREDENBURO, op. cit. supra
note s, at i 16. This promise of the company is typically not mentioned in the contract
form, but is added by amendment which includes a description or map of the retailer'
"trade area." INTERVIEW. The size of the trade area in a given contract depends upon
the relative bargaining power of the parties. See note 137 infra.
'This promise must, of course, be altered in those states which, by statute, require
that trading stamps be redeemable both in cash and in merchandise at the option of the
holder. See e.g., 2 REV. CODE OF WASH. § 19.84.020 (1951). Cf. WIs. STAT.
§ 00.5() (953) (requiring trading stamps to be redeemed in cash only). See
proposed legislation requiring redemption in cash, note 88 infra.
The price paid for stamps by retailers varies as between stamp companies but
generally ranges from two to three-tenths of a cent per stamp. VREDENBURG, Op. Cir.
supra note s, at 47; U. S. Department of Agriculture, Do Trading Stamps Affect Food
Costs?, Marketing Research Report No. 147, Jan. 1957, p. I.
": The "cash" value which the company assigns to each stamp does not represent
its monetary value, except where required by statute. See note 9 supra. Rather, it
represents the value of the stamp in terms of the average retail price of the items offered
for redemption. See, Trading Stamp: Bane or Boon?, Business Week, May 19, 1956,
P. 43.
2 Under the terms of the customary company-retailer contract, the retailer is required
to offer stamps to all customers at a specified number per amount of purchase. See
e.g., Sperry.& Hutchinson Company contract, Form z M Rev. Sept. so, 1956, on file in
Duke Law Library (requiring one stamp to be given for each ten-cent purchase).
" See note i i supra.
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While this characterization refers specifically to stamp companies,
it applies with some modification to a variety of independent stamp
plans.14 However, because stamp companies are economically more sig-
nificant, they will constitute the primary focus of this paper.
Trading-stamp companies have been in operation since the turn of
the century. Their origin, perhaps, is to be found in 'premiums offered
by manufacturers in the I88O's,15 but the first'authenticated adoption
of stamps was by Shuster's Departaent Store, of Milwaukee, in 1891.16
The oldest stamp company, in the strict sense, however, is the Sperry
& Hutchinson Company, which was founded in i9oo.' Judging from
the volume and dispersion of litigatiofn, companies such as these enjoyed
considerable prosperity in the period i9oo-25. Their modern growth
parallels the general business upswing following World War II, since
which time their rate of growth has been precipitous,, both in over-all
number and in individual size. The Sperry & Hutchinson Company,
trademark owner of "S & H Green Stamps," by far the largest in a
field of some 4o0 competitors, 19 has grown in assets from $9,oooooo in
1946 to $67,000,000 in 1954.20 This company alone distributes stamps
to more than 6oooo retailers, operates 450 redemption outlets, and
1" Stamp promotions similar in operation to the stamp company arrangement are the
store-owned companies, cooperative stamp companies, individual store stamp plans, and
cash register receipt plans. VREDENBURG, op. cit. supra note i, at 'o-6x. See also note
123 infra.
"This first premium plan was actually initiated in 1 851 by the B. T. Babbit Com-
pany, which attached coupons to its soap products. This practice was then adopted
by the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company and its competitors during the ,86o's
and was later extended t6 include the distribtuion of chromos and glassware to customers.
VREDENBURG, op. cit. supra note I, at 13i Wall Street Journal, Jan. 31, 1955, p. I.
" Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1S, 1953, p. I.
7 The Sperry & Hutchinson Company was incorporated by the state of New Jersey
in 9oo and is presently licensed to do business in all forty-eight states. INTERVIEW.
"8 From 1948 to 1955, the trading-stamp industry expanded from 15o to an estimated
370 companies. New York Retailer, Nov. 1955, P. 3- Illustrative of the recent growth
in volume of stamp company sales is the $350 million worth of stamps sold in 1956
which marked a 75% increase over 1955 sales. Vredenburg, Who Pays for Trading
Starnps?, 41 SCIENCE DIGEST 86 (Jan. 1957). Another source estimated that the
over-all sales of trading stamps to retailers in x956 totaled more than $6oo million.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Do Trading Stamps Affect Food Costs?, Marketing
Research Report No. 147, Jan. 1957, p. '. Further evidence of the volume of business
done by these companies is the estimated $65o-$805 million retail value of the redemption
premiums distributed in 1955. See, VREDENBERG, op. Cit. supra note i, at 36.
1" See U.S. Department of Agriculture Report, note 18 supra. An indication of the
size of the Sperry & Hutchinson Company is the reported $400 million worth of stamps
it sold in 1956, which constituted % of the combined sales of stamp companies for
that year. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 3, 1957, p. s.
* See, Comment, 24 TENN. L. REV. 557, 559 (1956).
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supplies stamps for more than twenty million stamp-saving consumers.2 '
The present size and popularity of the stamp operation have en-
gendered, especially among small retailers, an opposition which has ex-
pressed itself in attempts to obtain legislative regulation similar to that
demanded when stamps first emerged on the commercial scene, a half
century ago. Familiarity with the history of these early legislative
efforts, because of its present-day limiting effects, ig essential to any
understanding of the possible modes of resolution of the modern con-
troversy.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HxsTORy oF TRADING STAMPS
Probably the earliest devices employed to frustrate the use of trading
stamps2 were the existing "gift enterprise" statutes, which made it un-
lawful to offer a gift, premium, prize, or award to a purchaser in con-
nection with the sale of merchandise. These statutes, however, were
uniformly held inapplicable to trading-stamp operations, in that they
did not feature the elements of a "game of chance"; 23 and, in conse-
quence, stamp company opponents turned to the state legislatures for
assistance. Some states, accordingly, amended their "gift enterprise"
statutes to include stamps by definition; others imposed either "pro-
hibitory" license fees under the guise of a general licensing power or,
more directly, expressly banned any disbursement of trading stamps ; 21
s Brief submitted by the Sperry & Hutchinson Company to Hearings conducted by
the Consumer Counsel to the Governor of New York, Oct. 2, x956, p. S.
"Not to be considered in this paper are those measures enacted pursuant to the
general power of a state or properly empowered municipal corporation to license any
business or occupation within the community. See generally, Silverman, Bennett and
Lechliter, Control by Licensing Over Entry Into the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
234 (941).
s' It was early held that since the articles to be given as premiums are generally on
display and the redeeming consumer is given his choice of premiums from this display,
the scheme is not invalid as a "gift enterprise" or "lottery"-although the stamps are
redeemed by a party other than the one from whom the purchaser obtains them, the
premium is dependent upon the acquisition of a certain number of stamps, and the article
to be chosen is not definitely named. State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86, 35 So. z8 (1903) ;
Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 578, 6o N.E. 385 (x9o). Cf. Long v. State,
74 Md. 565, 22 At. 4 (891) ; State ex rel. Hartigan v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 94
Neb. 785, 144 N.W. 795 (19-3)i Winston v. Beesoni 135 N.C. 27i, 47 S.E. 457
(19o4). But see, Lansburgh v.'District of Columbia, ii App. D.C. 5 2 (1897) ; Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D.C. 253 (igo), cert. denied, 218 U.S. 673
(191o). See generally, Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws, 5 HARv. L. RFv.
xt96, 1202-03 (1932).
2" In general, these "prohibitory" license fees and statutes which explicitly prohibited
the issuance ?if stamps were directed against; (x)'persons engaged in the business of
selling or issuing trading stamps to merchants; .and/or (z) merchants issuink stamps in
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still others enacted a variety of regulatory measures which were so bur-
densome as to be prohibitory in effect.25
This body of anti-stamp legislation, however, was, for the most
part, discriminatory in application. Since impetus for its passage was
supplied mainly by groups of small independent retailers who acknowl-
edged the value of the trading stamp 4s a promotional device, this legis-
lation expressly exempted the stamp-giving retailer who offered redemp-
tion from his general stock in merchandise and the manufacturer who
attached to his product stamps or coupons for which he, too, provided
a means of redemption.2"
In the consequent litigation concerning the constitutionality of this
prohibitory legislation, the stamp companies enjoyed a marked success,
easily persuading the courts that it was beyond the power of a state
legislature to restrain, much less prohibit, the successful operation of a
"legitimate business."27  With the exception of Rast v. Deman &
Leis,28 decided in 1916, in which the Supreme Court held that the
connection with the sale of goodsi and (3) merchants issuing stamps redeemable by a
third party only.
" Illustrative of such regulatory measures are provisions requiring that each trading
stamp be valued and redeemed independently of other stamps and have printed thereon
the character of the article offered for redemption, [State ex rel. Simpson v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., ixo Minn. 378, 1z6 N.W. 120 (1910) (Minnesota statute held invalid
as imposing an unnecessary restriction amounting to practical prohibition)], and, the re-
quirement that the cash value of the stamp be printed legibly on its face and that re-
demption be available in cash or merchandise at the option of the holder, provided the
stamps are presented for redemption in a quantity aggregating not less that five cents
[(People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, 72 App. Div. 308, 76 N.Y. Supp. iii ( 3d Dep't.
1902) (New York statute held invalid on grounds that its application to stamp com-
panies only was an unconstitutional discrimination)]. See also, People ex rel. Appel v.
Zimmerman, io2 App. Div. 103, 92 N.Y. Supp. 497 (4th Dep't 19o5). For examples
of contemporary legislative proposals apparently designed to prohibit stamp-company
operations through strict regulation, see notes 71-73 infra.
"Typical discriminatory provisions are found in KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2210
(Supp. 1955) which imposes a license fee upon all persons causing trading stamps to be
distributed, but which excepts from its provisions those persons issuing stamps "re-
deemable at their face value, in cash or merchandise from the general stock of [the
issuing] merchant at regular retail prices at the option of the holder . . . [and manu-
facturers or packers who distribute a] coupon, ticket, certificate, card or other device...
redeemable for any goods, wares, or merchandise, free of charge or at less than the
retail price thereof, either by the manufacturer or packer or their agents." See, State
v. Wilson, 1o Kan. 789, x68 Pac. 679 (i917) (statute held constitutional). Although
this statute has been denounced as prohibitive by stamp companies, it appears that they
are still operating in the state. In 1955, the Kroger Company paid $71,ooo and the
Safeway Company paid $91,ooo in license fees in order to issue trading stamps for the
period of one year. Letter from John Anderson, Jr., Attorney General of Kansas, to the
Duke Bar Journal, Oct. 19, 1956, on file in Duke Law Library.
"
t See note 33 infra.
28 240 U.S. 342 (1916), 29 HARV. L. REV. 779, 2o LAw NOTES 161. The rationale
of the Rast opinion was fully supported by two other Supreme Court decisions also
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trading stamp is a proper object of state police power regulation,n and
a limited number of state court decisions,30 the courts, in an overwhelm-
ing majority of cases, have invalidated such legislation.$' But, curiously,
decided in x9x6, Tanner v'. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (i916) and Pitney v. Washington,
240 U.S. 387 (1916).
., The Rast case involved the validity of a Florida statute which imposed, upon
any merchant distributing stamps, a state license fee of $Soo plus a license fee of $25o
payable to each county in which such merchant transacted business. In reversing a
district court decree enjoining the enforcement of the statute on groundQ that it was
violative of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court not only dismissed these
grounds, but, as well, it expressly dispelled any notion that such a statute violated either.
the commerce or contracts clauses. Furthermore, Mr. Justice MeKenna, speaking for a
unanimous court, flatly rejected the argument that the trading stamp is an innocuous
advertising device immune to prohibition. "Advertising is merely identification and
description, apprising of quality and place. It has no other object than to draw
attention to the article to be sold, and the acquisition of the article to be sold constitutes
the only inducement to its purchase. . . . The schemes of complainants .. .rely upon
something else than the article sold. They tempt by a prqmise of a value greater than
that article and apparently not represented in its price, and it hence may be thought
that thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence. This may not be called in an
exact sense a 'lottery,' may not be called 'gaming'; it may, however, be considered as
having the seduction and evil of such, and whether it has may be a matter of inquiry,
a matter of inquiry and judgment that it is finally within the power of the legislature
to make ...and it is not required that we should be sure as to the precise reasons for
such judgment, or that we should certainly know them, or be convinced of the wisdom
of the legislation." 740 U.S. at 365-66.
It has been suggested that the "improvidence," resulting from the desire of the
consumer to obtain the "redemption premium," not only refers to buying in overly
excessive quantities, as suggested in the Rast case, but that, also, it consists of pur-
chasing without regard to grade, quality or price, and, as such, would appear to provide
further justification for anti-stamp legislation. Wolff, Sales Promotion by Premiums
as a Competitive Device, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1,74, 118o (2940). See note 57 infra.
"o Kansas, Louisiana, and Maryland expressly adopted the rationale of the Rast
case in sustaining anti-stamp legislation. See, State v. Crosby Bros. Mercantile Co.,
103 Kan. 733, 176 Pac. 321 (1918) ;State v. Wilson, zot Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679
(.917); State v. Underwood, 139 La. 288, 71 So. 513 (19xS); State v. J. M. Seney
Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 At. 289 (2929). See also, Pitney v. Washington, 8o Wash.
699, 141 Pac. 883 (914), aff'd 240 U.S. 387 (i916). Cf. District of Columbia v.
Kraft, 35 App. D.C. 253 (2920), cert. denied, z8 U.S. 673 (291o); Lansburgh v.
District of Columbia, i App. D.C. 512 (1897); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State,
188 Ind. 173, 22 N.E. 584 (2929) (declaring the trading stamp to be a proper
object of police power regulation, but invalidating a discriminatory statute on equal
protection grounds); Olsen v. Ross, 39 N.D. 372, x67 N.W. 385 (2x8); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, 269 Wis. 562, 173 N.W. 325 (2929).
"XSee, e.g., Humes v. Little Rock, 238 Fed. 929 (x898); Ex parte Drexel, 147
Cal. 763, 8z Pac. 429 (1905); Ex parte McKenna, 2z6 Cal. 429, 58 Pac. 916 (1899);
United Cigar Stores v. People, 68 Co1. 546, 19o Pac. 1117 (2g2o); United Cigar
Stores v. Stewart, 244 Ga. 7z4, 87 S.E. 2034 (2926) ; Territory v. M. A. Gunst &
Co., 18 Hawaii 196 (2907); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65
N.W.zd 420 (2954); Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 297 Ky. 394, 247 S.W. 14
(2923) ; State ex rel. Simpson v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 22o Minn. 378, t26 N.W.
220 (2go) ; People ex rel. Attorney General v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich.
532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917); State ex rel. Hartigan v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 94
Neb. 785, 144 N.W. 795 (-2913); State v. Lothrops-Farnham, 84 N.H. 3zz, i q At.
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whether these decisions, considered together, support the broad proposi-
tion that the trading-stamp industry is immune to priohibitory legislation
is open to question.
First, the validity of the allegedly prohibitory statutes examined in
many of these cases was determined with reference to a strict definition of
police power, which was then deemed to embrace only public health,
safety, and morals.32 Consequently, it was universally declared that the
stamp company is a "legitimate enterprise," since it merely provided the
retailer with a "cash discount service."" Further, the trading stamp was
5SI (1930) i State v. Ramseyer, 73 N.H. 31, 58 Atl. 958 (19o4) 5 State v. Holtgreve, 58
Utah 563, zoo Pac. 894 (192). Cf. Alabama Independent Service Stations Ass'n. v.
Hunter, 249 Ala. 403, 31 So. 2d 571 (1947) 5 Denver v. United Cigar Stores, 68 Colo.
363, 189 Pac. 848 (i92o); Hewin v. Atlanta, zi Ga. 723, 49 S.E. 765 (1905) ;
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, i88 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1919)5 Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 3o N.E.2d z69 (1940) 5 Opinion of
Justices, 226 Mass. 613, 115 N.E. 978 (1917)5 People v. Victor, -287 Mich. 5o6, 283
N.W. 666 (1939)i International Trading-Stamp Co. v. Memphis, ioi Tenn. 18s,
47 S.W. 136 (x898). See also, cases cited notes 23 supra. For a collection of cases
involving trading stamp legislation, see generally, Comment, 24 TENN. L. REV. 557
(1956) 5 Notes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 265 (1956), 40 YALE L. J. I112 (1931), 133
A.L.R. 1087 (1941) i24 A.L.R. 341 (i94o); 26 A.L.R. 707 (1923).
" See, e.g., People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman, 1o2 App. Div. 103, 92 N.Y.
Supp. 497 (4 th Dep't 19o5) ; State v. Dalton, 22 R.I. 77, 46 AUt. 234 (19oo) 5 State
v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197, 56 Atl. 983 (904). In commenting on these early cases and
their influence in later decisions against trading stamp legislation, the Supreme Court of
Kansas described the former as being "made at a time when the police power of
the state was regarded as much more restricted in its scope than accords with present
day conceptions, and the later decisions were influenced by those already made .... The
assumption that police power extends only to the protection of the health, safety and
morals of the public, which was at one time quite general, is now out of date. The
modern view is that the state may control the conduct of individuals by regulation which
upon reasonable grounds can be regarded as adapted to promoting the common welfare,
convenience or prosperity." State v. Wilson, tox Kan. 789, 794, L69 Pac. 674, 681
(1917). For a discussion of the propriety of contemporary state legislation restricting
trading stamp operations, see the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Garfield in Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 25-38, 65 N.W.zd 41o, 419-26 (1954).
Cf. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV.
91, 109-13, 117-18 (1950).
"The primary contention of the stamp companies, and the one which seems to
form the basis of the majority of decisions invalidating anti-stamp legislation, is that
the trading stamp system is merely a method of discounting bills in consideration of
immediate payment in cash, which not only benefits the consumer, but, as well, affords
the retailer a means of avoiding the extension of credit. See, note 61 infra. See, e.g.,
Denver v. Frueauff, 39 Colo. 2o, 88 Pac. 389 (1907) 5 Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods
Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 S.W. 14 (1923) ; State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200
Pac. 894 (1921). Cf. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 4o8, 30 N.E.
2d 269 (1940). Moreover, in the Lawton case, supra at 16, it was held that this
legitimate cash discount device is as free from evils as are other common forms of
business activity. For the court reasoned that the trading stamp (i) operates no more
as a "lure to improvidence" than do the conventional methods of advertising, (z) has
no greater a "parasitic" effect than do factors, brokers, agents, and commission merchants,
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held to be an advertising device which contained none of the elements
characteristic of lotteries, one of a small class of activities then held to be
subject to legislative prohibition,84 because the consumer's right to ac-
quire the redemption premium was not contingent, but became "fixed"
upon the purchase of the merchandise with which the stamp was given.85
Secondly, it should be observed that a substantial number of these
cases invalidated, under state constitutions, prohibitory legislation which
exempted "self-redeemers," holding this to be a discriminatory classifica-
tion for which no reasonable basis in fact demonstrably existed."" It is
often difficult, therefore, to determine whether a particular decision
reted upon the premise that the trading stamp is not a proper object of
police power regulation, or, that such power existed but was improperly
exercised. Nevertheless, it is arguable that since the strict definition
(3) is characterized by nonredemption forfeitures which are similar to large funds on
deposit in banks which have never been claimed, (4) gives an opportunity for coercion
similar to that which has traditionally marked the practices of "wholesalers who desire
to introduce some novelty or new line of goods," and (5) does not tend to "stifle com-
petition" beciuse it is employed by the large retailer since the advantages inuring to
such retailer stem from the fact that "it buys in larger quantities, discounts its bills
for cash, and is therefore able to sell at a cheaper price, regardless of whether it uses
stamps or not."
", For a discussion of the effective scope of the various "lottery" statutes, see Pickett,
supra note 23. See also, note x16 infra.
"s "The right to have the stamps redeemed depends upon no contingency, chance, or
lot whatsoever. The person receiving the stamps upon the purchase of goods is not in
any degree deprived of his choice or will. Indeed, by the contract. . . .[tihe right of
selection among the articles kept by the stamp company in its store is expressly given....
There is therefore no uncertainty as to the nature, character, or value of the premiums
w ..With which the stamps are redeemed." Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 282,
47 S.E. 457, 46o-61 (1904). See also, Denver v. Frueauff, 39 Coio. 2o, 35, 88 Pac.
389, 394 (907); State ex rel. Simpson v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., i so Minn. 378,
iz6 N.W. izo (i9xo).
.'See, e.g. People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman, 1o2 App. Div. 103, 92 N.Y. Supp.
497 ( 4th Dep't 1905)5 People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, 72 App. Div. 308, 76
N.Y. Supp. iii ( 3d Dep't 9o7.); State v. Dalton, z2 R.I. 77, 46 Atl. 234 (1goo);
State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197, 56 Atl. 983 (904). In cases, decided subsequent to
the Rast case, invalidating statutes which, in effect, drew a distinction among persons
issuing trading stamps, the basis of decision appears uniformly to have been based
upon considerations of equal protection, with the question as to whether or not stamps
could be regulated under the police power generally reserved. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. j84 (gi9); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh,
246 Iowa 9, 65 N.W.zd 410 (1954); People ex rel. Attorney General v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N.W. 503 (1917); State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah
563, 200 Pac. 894 (1921). Cf. Opinion of Justices, 226 Mass. 613, 115 N.E. 978
(1917)- Contra, State v. Wilson, 1o Kan. 789, z68 Pac. 679 (1917); State v. J. M.
Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 107 At]. 189 (1919); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle,166 Wis. 6T3, 166 N.W. 54 (1918).
"This is especially true of those decisions rendered before x916 since the precedent
invalidating stamp legislation existing prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Rast case was clearly insufficient to restrain the state courts from holding discriminatory
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then accorded police power has been expanded substantially to include
those measures enacted in the interest of public convenience or the
general prosperity 3 and, since judicial philosophies concerning the re-
view of state economic legislation have been liberalized considerably,
contemporary legislation, at least if uniformly prohibitory, might be
upheld." And even if such legislation were discriminatory-4.e., if it
excepted manufacturer's premiums and "self-redeemers"--recent de-
velopments in constitutional doctrine according greater. legislative free-
dom in classification in economic matters might suffice 'to justify it.40
III
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TADING STAMPS
Fundamentally, the contention of those advocating prohibition of
trading stamps is that the non-stamp-giving retailer is injured by this
"unfair" competitive device and that the economy is thereby impaired.
The basic argument of the stamp companies, on the other hand, is that
through the use of stamps, the consuming public is benefited by price
savings on redemption merchandise. To what extent are these assertions
supportable?
The immediate economic casualties of trading stamps are found
legislation invalid on grounds of due process. And although it is well settled that
Supreme Court interpretations as to the fourteenth amendment due process clause are
not binding upon state court interpretations of similar constitutional provisions, they
are, however, highly persuasive and perhaps sufficient to negate these pre-Rast decisions
as authority for the" conclusion that trading stamps are immune from police power
regulation. See, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 925-38, 65 N.W.2d
410, 419-26 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
.. See note 32 supih. Although this broader concept of police power has been less
readily adopted by state courts, it was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as
x9o6. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Commissioner, 2oo U.S. 561, 592 (19o6).
"
9 The landmark case in this area is Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 ( )934)
in which the Supreme Coturt abandoned the doctrine which limited regulation of business
to those "affected with the public interest" and declared that "[s]o far as the requirement
of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state
is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adopted to its purpose." 291 U.S.
at 537. See also, Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S..
183 (1936); CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION, 107-o8. (1938); HAMILTON, THE
PATH OF DuE PROcESS OF LAW, THE CONsTITTION RECONSIDERED 167 (Read ed.
1938). Although, in the light of this precedent, a substantial number of state courts
have, been reluctant to upset state economic regulation, there are a few which have
continued freely to disregard legislative policies in this area by distinguishing the
federal precedents, or by adhering to a stricter construction of state constitution due
process provisions. See generally, Paulsen, supra note 32. Noies, 44 K. L. J. 3.
(1956); g 9MINN. L. REV. 804 (1955)-
o Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); State v. Wilson, oi Kan. 789, 168
Pac. 679 (917).
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among the retailers of two separate catagories: first, the non-stamp-giving
retailers competing in markets with stamp-giving retailers; and second,
retailers competing with companies in the distribution of the type of
merchandise given by the companies as redemption premiums.
With respect to injury--i.e., loss of trade-it is dear that the non-
stamp-giving retailer is disadvantaged vis-d-vis his stamp-giving com-
petitor.; this is, in fact, the very rais6n d'Stre of trading stamps. The
mqasure of the successful attainment of this purpose is to be found in
the widespread popularity of stamps as a merchandising technique.4'
While the degree of injury suffered will vary with the development of
stamps within the consumer area42 that injury exists and is substantial
appears to be indisputible.
There seems to be little doubt that retailers in competition with stamp
companies in the distribution of premium merchandise also suffer wide-
spread and substantial injury. Many consumers undoubtedly believe
that the merchandise that they receive at stamp-company redemption
outlets is, as has been implied, "free. '4 3  Those who suspect that they
may have paid for the stamps in higher prices for the commodities with
which the stamps were "given" ofteri believe that the price was no higher
than the value of the merchandise which the stamps will obtain, or,
that if it was higher, the process is a painless method of prepayment for
the redemption item." In any case, however, the effect is the same:
the diversion of trade from the traditional purveyor of such commodities
to stamp-companies.
The discrimination inherent in the exemption of manufacturer's
premiums from the operation of prohibitory statutes45 appears justified
41 See note I supra.
"In an area where the stamp-saving'habit has been conditioned and one or a few
brands of stamps predominate, the injury will be greater.4See notes 58 and 127 infra.
"There is some evidence that stamp-saving consumers recognize that they pay for
stamps in the form of higher prices. For example, in a survey conducted in the grocery
trade in Denver, Colorado, almost one-half of the stamp-saving consumers polled believed
that they paid for stamps through higher prices. Study Prepared by the Bureau of
Business and Social Research, University of Denver, March t954, pp. 13-14. The stamp
companies, though contending that consumers do not pay for stamps, argue that even
if they do, this is still beneficial to them as it provides a method of saving in small
amounts to obtain the type of merchandise offered as redemption premiums. INTERVIEW.
Another suggestion as to why consumers purchase with knowledge that they are paying
for the stamps is that the housewife, ifi the typical instance, while not desirous of
spending grocery money directly for household luxuries, may do so indirectly, thus
appearing to her family as frugal rather than frivolous. New York Times, Sept.
30, x956, § 3 P. I.
4s Seesnote z6 supra.
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on the basis of their effect upon the two types of retailers most injured
by the stamp operation. The non-stamp-giving retailer appears totally
unaffected, for while such premium offers may shift trade volume from
one product to another, they do not shift trade between retailers. The
retailer of premium merchandise, though susceptible to some reduction
in sales of those commodities which manufacturers employ as premiums,
does not experience any great degree of injury because manufacturers
generally offer as premiums an extremely limited variety of low cost'
items constituting only a small portion of the -retailer's stock in trade.
Whether similar justification exists for the exemption of self-redeemers 6
is less dear; although it can be argued that because they are small and
local, the demand for their stamps would not be great and would not
shift volume substantially, and injury to non-stamp-giving merchants
would, therefore, be insignificant. Similarly, injury to retailers of
premium merchandise would be insubstantial since the self-redeemer
normally redeems only from his stock in trade. In view of the fact that
some large grocery chains are self-redeemers, however, this basis of dis-
tinction should be subjected to closer scrutiny.45 These justifications for
exemptions, incidentally, would be quite compatible with a legislative
finding that stamps are inherently injurious, for the legislature may dis-
tinguish between degrees of injury, and it is unnecessary for it to elim-
inate all evils of the area in which it acts.49
For retailers who employ them, stamps are a cost which varies di-
rectly with total sales. The retailer, in order to maintain the profit his
enterprise earned prior to the installation of stamps, must either raise
prices or so increase his sales volume that the consequent extra profit
will defray the added cost of stamps." While, undoubtedly, there are
, Ibid.
,' Such an argument was favorably considered by the court in State V. Wilson, tot
Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (917) which upheld the discriminatory Kansas statute. See
note 26 supr-a.
"See VREDENBERG, op. cit. supra note i, at 53.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Railway Express Agency v. People of
the State of New York, 336 U.S. io6 (1949).
"0 The companies have suggested that even though trading stamps are a cost of
business for the retailer, they need not be an extra cost for they may replace other
advertising and promotional expenses. It is undoubtedly true that the extra cost of
stamps would be diminished in some degree by this substitution. On the other hand.
some retailers, especially grocers, make a practice of issuing extra stamps on certain
days, often called "double stamp days,"2 and are permitted so to do by many company
contracts. Here, the cost of the stamps in relation to sales has doubled. Though this
practice has been defended by the companies on the theory that the bonus stamps are
given on "slow" days thus spreading sales volume more evenly through the week and
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a few situations where the installation of stamps will increase profits to
such a degree,5 1 to the extent that it does not, the retailer, in most situa-
tions, must raise his prices proportionately. Thus, the cost of stamps
to consumers resulting from higher prices will vary inversely with the
power of stamps to attract a larger sales volume and the ability of the
retailer to keep other costs constant. Although some price increase is
necessary in the great number of cases, it will be somewhat less than the
cost of stamps to the retailers; that is, part will be absorbed, part passed
on to the consumer.
In considering the factors influencing the price which the consumer
pays for stamps, two other elements should be accorded some weight.
First, as more of the individual retailer's competitors adopt stamp plans,
the power of stamps to increase his sales volume will diminish, and the
price increase to the consumer will tend to approach the cost increase to
the retailer. Second, there is a tendency for non-stamp-giving retailers
to adopt price reductions as a defensive measure,52 and to the extent
that this-tactic is adopted, the consumer is paying more, in a relative
sense, by continuing to purchase at the stamp-giving store. While re-
duction of prices is only one method of regaining trade lost to stamp-
giving stores, any method which accomplishes this result will lower
volume at the stamp-giving store, causing a greater share of the costs of
stamps to be borne by its remaining customers.
As to the basic arguments, then, it may fairly be concluded that
injury to retailers is substantial and that consumers share some burden
of the cost of stamps, though some price saving is ordinarily involved as
well. Moreover, the injury and the savings are relatable-that is, the
greater the savings to the consumer, the greater the injury to the non-
stamp-giving retailer.
While the questions of injury to retailers and benefit to consumers
are basic to an informed judgment concerning the legality of the trading
stamp operation, both those advocating and those resisting prohibition
have proffered, though seldom fully articulated, further rationales to
buttress their fundamental contentions.
Merchants, apparently in response to the stamp companies' charge
effecting a more efficient use of store facilities, it is to be doubted whether the economies
thus obtained are sufficient to offset the cost of the extra stamps given.
"' See the discussion of the requirements for successful installation of a stamp plan in
VREDENBURG, op. cit. fapra note z, at 62..
" In a recent survey conducted by Selling Research Inc., it was found that 52% of
non-stamp-ming grocers and 23% of non-stamp-using druggists employ price reduction
as a defense against stamp-using competitors. Editor & Publisher, March 16, 1957, p. 19 .
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that prohibitory measures are "special interest legislation," have at-
tempted to argue that trading stamps injure the economy directly as
well as indirectly through injury to themselves. Thus, they contend that
even if certain price -savings are apparently afforded the consumer, this
is not an unmitigated benefit. First, price savings inure to the consumer
only upon redemption. Nonredemption of stamps, for which a price has
probably been extracted, is clearly a detriment to the economy." While
consumer loss through non-redemption is an important and inherent
feature of the trading stamp operation, an argument for prohibition of
trading stamps based on this factor is not persuasive, in as much as less
heroic measures for consumer protection appear feasible.54
Second, stamps are normally distributed to consumers by retailers
whose commodities fall within the category of "necessities" (e.g.,
groceries, gasoline, fuel, etc.), whereas the predominant type of mer-
chandise offered as redemption premiums is more in the nature of
"luxuries" (e.g., toys, appliances, sporting goods, etc.). The argument
then proceeds that since the consumer pays for stamps to some degree,
a given amount of money will purchase fewer "necessities." People
in low-income groups who cannot afford "luxuries" and who buy at stamp
stores are forced either to manage with fewer "necessities" or to obtain
increased income in wages, which, in turn, increases prices, forcing up
the cost-of-living index.55 This contention, while theoretically sound,
seems of secondary importance as a basis for the prohibition of the
stamp industry because of the obvious difficulty in obtaining adequate
supportive economic data.
The third contention urged by critics of the stamps is that the injury
to retailers has the effect of eliminating the small independent mer-
chant, especially in such fields as groceries and drugs.5" As competition
' The stamp companies, of course, argue 'that they use the funds so obtained to
provide premiums for customers at lower prices. But see, text to notes 65-66 infra.
"4 Namely, escheat of the reserves maintained by the company for unredeemed
stamps. See text to notes 74-78 infra.
" Because only-increased efficiency in production or distribution is capable of raising
absolute consumer demand, trading stamps merely shift demand from "necessities" to
"luxuries."
"The stamp companies, of course, contend that stamps assist the small independent
retailer to compete with the larger chain stores. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., for example,
claims that 99% of its 6o,ooo "licensees" are "small, independent merchants." Brief
submitted by the Sperry & Hutchinson Co. to Hearings conducted by the Consumer
Counsel to the Governor of New York, Oct. 2, 1956, p. 15. Such a statistic is entirely
misleading. First, a substantial number of these "licensees" are in a type of trade in
which nearly all retailers are small, e.g., gasoline retailers. Second, the figure is mean-
ingless without an analysis of the volume of stamps distributed by "licensees" of different
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diminishes, monopoly power of stamp-giving retailers, especially chain
stores, increases, which, when exercised, will injure consumers. Thus,
while in the short run, the consumer may benefit, in the long run, he
suffers. Manifestly, this argument has weaknesses, especially in its
assumnption that monopoly power could effectively be exercised against:
the check of lower prices offered by the remaining competitive retailers. 7
The stamp companies, aside from arguing the case for consumer
savings, have presented several affirmative defenses based upon the
economic function and utility of the trading stamp operation. They con-
tend that stamps, in essence, serve a dual purpose: for retailers, they
function as a form of advertising; for consumers, they provide mer-
chandise. The stamp companies contend that, per se, both of these
functions are recognized as proper, the interdiction of which would be
constitutionally unjustified. Moreover, the companies have chosen
to argue that in performing these functions, they contribute valuable
services to the economy.
As to the "mere advertising" defense, it is necessary to recognize
at the outset that advertising, as such, is not immune to governmental
regulation where it may operate to.defraud the public. The opponents
of stamps, thus, condemn as fraudulent the representation that stamps
sizes; one large grocery chain may well have a sales volume exceeding that of thousands
of independent grocers. Moreover, irrespective of the distribution of a stamp company
such as Sperry & Hutchinson, because the trend of larger chain groceries is to form,
own, or control a stamp company of their own, the conclusion that stamps injure smaller
competitors remains. If a smaller retailer in attempting to hold his share of the trade
adopts stamps, the result is often unsatisfactory, for the nature of the stamp plan's
operations tends to limit its efficacy to larger enterprises. See VREDENBURG, Op. Cit.
supra note i, at 63.
An indication of the adverse affect of stamps upon the snhall, independent merchant
in the grocery field is reflected in a preliminary report of the Department of Agriculture
which found -thai while sales volume in food supermarkets using stamps gained
xo.2% in the first half of 1956, small stores using stamps actually lost 44% sales
volume. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Do Trading Stamps Affect Food Costs?,
Marketing Research. Report No. 147, Jan. 1957. See, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 2,
1957, P- 3. Furthermore, it appears that some of the larger stamp companies discrim-
inate against small retailers with respect to the price of stamps. See note 133 infra.
"' Another contention that has been advanced by critics of stamps is a modified version
of the "lure to improvidence" argument announced by the Supreme Court in the Rast
case, see note 29 supra. As first enunciated, it appears to refer to possible consumer
injury resulting from excessive buying .to obtain stamps for redemption premiums.
Thus stated, the argument is unrealistic and properly subject to the criticism it received.
See note 29 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1916). See also, State v. Lothrops-Farnham Co.,
84 N.H. 322, i5o Atl. 551 (1930); People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666
(1939). However, if the "improvident buying" argument is regarded as buying with
. undue disregard of quality or price, the contention that there is substantial likelihood
of consumer injury has considerably more merit. See, Wolff, Sales Promotion by
Premiums as a Competitfie Practice, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 11741 1177 (1940).
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are "free" because, ordinaily, the consumer pays at least a portion of
the cost of stamps in the form of higher prices. This is a tenuous basis
for complete prohibition of the companies' activities, however, for
although it is not known to what extent the companies utilize the term
"fret" in their advertising, the obvious and direct remedy would be to
prohibit its use. 8
Even assuming, however that the stamp company in pursuing its
advertising function is not susceptible to prohibition, there is still some
question as to the economic utility of this activity. Under classical defini-
tions, the function of advertising is to apprise consumers of their needs,
what products may satisfy these needs, and where and it what price
these products may be obtained. 59 The promotional method of the stamp
companies would not seem to satisfy this standard of advertising, for it
publicizes only the redemption premiums, not the commodities sold by
stamp-giving retailers. Seemingly, then, this claim of economic utility
merits little consideration. Indeed, since stamps merely induce pur-
chasers to trade with one retailer6° rather than another, no net benefit
accrues to the economy.
The other basis for the stamp companies' claim of economic utility
" It is quite possible that the Federal Trade Commission may take action to prevent
the use of the word "free" in stamp company advertising as a "deceptive practice"
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See note 127 infra. It would seem
to be within the power of a state legislature similarly to prohibit the word's use. Even
then, it might reasonably be contended that, in light of the widespread acceptance of the
opiration and past practice, this .meisure alone would be insufficient to protect the
public. A stronger remedy might be state legislation requiring companies to print in
each stamp-savings book an express denial of any claims that premium merchandise is
"free." Even though such legislation might cause a popular disaffection for stamps
which in turn would alleviate some injury to non-stamp retailers, because its primary
purpose would be to protect consumers, such action would appear to be within the
legislative power.
" For a classical definition of advertising, see Mr. justice McKenna's opinion in
the Rast case, note 29 supra.
"The companies contend that stamps are a form of "cash discount," inducing con-
sumers to pay cash and thereby saving the retailer the expense of credit operations.
Brief submitted by the Sperry & Hutchinson Co. to Hearing conducted by The Consumer
Counsel to the Governor of New York, Oct. 2, 1956, p. 8. This argument, lowever, dis-
regards not only the fact that most trading-stamp retailers would operate on a cash basis
irrespective of their use of trading stamps, but also that the companies themselves permit
the distribution of stamps to credit purchasers provided that they pay their accounts within
normal credit periods. Moreover, even if a retailer experienced a reduction of credit
problems through the handling of stamps, such a benefit would at least be offset by
the additional expense of operating a stamp plan. Therefore, while the "cash discount"
approach to the stamp operation may possess some historical warrant, its application to
present legal and economic -problems, confuses objective discussion in this area. Cf.
Comment, Trading Sta ps:,4 Challenge to Regulation of Price. Competition, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 242, 247-49 (1956).
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is that their business is similar to that of chain stores and mail-order
houses which are now recognized as legitimate, although they were also
subjected to some legal restriction at their inception." Howiver, the
claimed similarity to these large-scale distributors appears to lie solely in
the fact that the attacks on them, as well as trading-stamp operations,
have been sponsored by small, independent merchants; 62 otherwise, "their
economic functions at present appear quite distinct. Chain stores and
mail-order houses seek to maintain an advantageous competitive position
by passing on the benefits of large-scale economies to the consumer in the
form of price savings. The stamp companies contend that they, too,
share the benefits of their economies with the public, but indications are
that this, while possible, is not so at present.
The merchandise purchased by stamp companies as redemption
premiums typically consists of appliances, sporting goods, toys, and
some hardware and soft goods-items which, because of their limited
demand, normally require a high retail mark-up. The companies buy
these items in bulk directly from the manufacturers, thus eliminating
middlemen's profits and securing generous quantity discounts. 3  This
merchandise is then traded for stamps in a market guaranteed by the
original sale of the stamps to the stamp-giving retailers. The genius of
the stamp companies' promotion is that the "hard-selling article" is tied
to the fast-selling necessities, which enables the company to reap the
high profit margin rewards of massed distribution of ,"hard-selling
articles." This, plus forfeitures to the company resulting from non-
redemption afford ample opportunity for substantial profits in the stamp
operation." The crucial question, however, is to what degree these
profits are shared with the consumer.
Stamp companies, as has been noted, issue stamps to the merchant
"See references in OPPENHEIM, CASES ON UNFAIR COMPETION 682 (1948).
'The stamp companies contend that besides the pressure exerted upon state legisla-
tures by retailer associations, that the present legislative, judicial and investigatory activity
directed against trading stamps was instigated and directed by a large grocery chain,
which, subsequent to the removal of its president, has called a truce in its war on
trading stamps. INTERVIEW. For another view of this story, see, Comment, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 557 (x956). Nevertheless, judging from the militant attitude of the retail
trade associations, it is improbable that the anti-stamp movement will subside.
" It is widespread rumor that the Sperry & Hutchinson Company is the largest
"distributor of sterling silver and one of the largest buyers of small appliances." Wall
Street Journal, Apr. 3, 1957, P. i. As to the legality of quantity discounts under
the Robinson-Patman Act, see note 129 infra.
"'In addition to the nonredemption forfeitures themselves, the company obtains
the investment returns, prior to the time of redemption, of the money received by the
company from the retailer. See Comment, 24 TENN. L. REv. 557, 568 (956).
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at the price, on the average, of one-quarter of a cent per stamp. Most
companies value the' stamp in the possession of the consumer at this
same figure, and redemption premiums are assigned a "cash" value in
terms of stamps. equal to the average price of that article on the retail
market. 5 Thus, the economies of scale are apparently earmarked for
stamp company surplus rather than for the consumer. It must be re-
membered, however, that while this seems to be the present operation
of the companies, it is quite possible that they may alter their policies
and allocate a portion of these profits to consumers. This could be done
by altering any one of three variables. They might reduce the price
bf the stamps to the retailers; or raise the arbitrary valuation of the
stamps in the possession of the consumer; or "price" redemption premi-
ums, in terms of stamps, below the retail price. It appears, however,
that their existing practice sharply differentiates stamp companies from
chain stores and mail-order houses on the basis of economic function and
utility.
Analysi.5 of the conflicting contentions of the stamp companies and
their opponents indicates that substantial economic detriment flows from
the trading-stamp operation and is only partially compensated for by the
economic utility of the industry. Should prohibitory meisures be en-
acted, however, this superior economic argument might well be counter-
balanced by the overwhelming, though dated, legal precedent to the
contrary. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that if such prohibitory legisla-
tion were enacted, sufficient grounds for judicial sanction could be found.
IV
STATE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In 1955, over fifty bills, apparently designed to frustrate stamp-
company operations, were introduced in the legislatures of twenty-four
states,66 but only two were adopted.67  Of these, one was invalidated
5 INTERVIEW.
*s Bills were introduced in the legislatures of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho; Illinois, Iowa, Marylhnd, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming. VREDENBERG, oP.
cit. supra note x, at 149; Advertising Age, XXVI, No. 30, p. 6o (July 25, 1955).
" The North Dakota Legislature enacted a statute which authorizes each county in
the state to levy a $6,ooo license-fee upon any stamp company operating within county
lines. Letter from Gerald G. Glaser, Ass't Attorney General of North Dakota, to the
Duke Bar Journal, Oct. xS, 1956, on file in Duke Law Library. The Utah Legislature
amended the Unfair Sales Act which deems it illegal to reduce prices on the retail
level through the use of trading stamps. INTERVIEW.
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by a referendum in the general election of I956," and the effectiveness
of the other has been abated pending a decision as to its constitution-
ality." These bills reflect a wide range of hostility to trading stamp
operations, but significantly, only a few of the proposals advanced would
have expressly prohibited stamp operations70 or imposed gross receipts
taxes"' or license fees so excessive as to be tantamount to prohibition."
Two popular provisions Wvould have required registration of companies
and agents with a moderate license fee and bonding of companies.73 But
the most important type of provision, introduced in fourteen different
legislatures, would have escheated to the state the reserves representing
unredeemed stamps.74
" The North Dakota statute, note 67 supra, was submitted to a referendum on No-
vember 6, 1956, and was defeated by a vote of 159,8o to 84,319. INTERVIEW.
" The constitutionality of the Utah statute, as amended, note 67 supra, is presently
being challenged by the Sperry & Hutchinson Co. INTERVIEW.
,1 Outright prohibition of stamps are sought in the legislatures of Illinois, Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming. VREDENBURG, Op. cit. supra
npte x, at 149.S 1 Proposalb to tax the gross receipts of trading stamp companies at a specified
percentage were introduced in Idaho, Iowa, Nevada and Texas. VREDENBURG, Op. Cit.
supra note 51.Et 149. The Texas proposal would have imposed "an occupational tax
... equal to five per cent (5%) of the gross receipts received by the [stamp company]
from business' done in the Stlte." House Journal, Apr. is, z955, p. 169o. On February
21, 1957, the Tennesce Legislature amended 12 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203, Item
so6 (1955), to impose a two per cent tax upon the "gross receipts derived from the
sale within the state ... of all goods, ware or merchandise . ., with which any stamps
... are delivered to the purchaser." This tax does not apply, however, to the merchant
who issues stamps redeemable at their face value in cash or in merchandise from his gen-
eral stock or the manufacturer or packer who both issues and reedems stamps or coupons.
2 Prohibitive license fees were proposed in the legislatures of Alabama, Colorado,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 'South Dakota, Tennessee
and Wyoming. VREDENBURG, op. Cit. supra note x, at 149. As to the extent of the
burden which a stamp company might be required to assume under one of these pro-
visions, see note 26 supra.
" Most of the recently proposed bills, except those which would have prohibited
outright the issuance of stamps, fairly uniformly required the registration of stamp
companies and- their agents, and/or a bond at a fixed sum or at a percentage of stamp
company sales in qrder to protect retailers against possible non-performance by the
stamp company of the company-retailer contract and to insure the availability to con-
sumers of the redempion premiums. A far more restrictive protective device was the
proposal introduced' in the New York legislature which would have required, as a
prerequisite to issuipk stamps, that a "certificate to engage in such business [be
granted] by the banking department of New York." It further provided that "[n]o
[stamps] shall be sold or issued unless there shall be placed on deposit in a bank or trust
company, a fund or sum of money equal to the value of such [stamps] under the super-
vision and direction of the banking department. Such fund or sum of money shall
remain on deposit until all outstanding [stamps] are redeemed." N.Y. Assembly Bill
No. 2o85, Feb. x, x96. It has been reported that this proposal has again been sub-
mitted to the New York legislature. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1957, p. 14.
", Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Utah. VREDENBERGO,
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A significant characteristic of the stamp operation is the fact that some
of the stamps distributed are never presented to the company for re-
demption.75 It requires no subtle analysis to demonstrate that the funds
received by the company from the retailer and against which these un-
redeemed stamps were issued should not inure to the stamp company.
Rather, since these funds were obtained from retailers and consumers
within the state, the benfit thereof should logically accrue to the state
itself."6 While this legislative object seems dearly justified, the efficacy
op. cit. supra note I, at 149. By far, the most comprehensive escheat proposals were
those introduced in the Kentucky, Colorado, and Nebraska legislatures. For example,
Ky. H.B. No. 4, 4 th Sess., April 9, 5956, provided that: (,) a graduated license tax
be imposed upon stamp-issuing retailers, (2) a minimum tax of $5ooo or 5% of gross
receipts be levied upon stamp conpanies, (3) a bond be posted by stamp companies, (4)
the date and state of. issue and cash value be printed on all stamps, (5) stamps must be
redeemable in numbers aggregating not less than ten cents in cash or in merchandise at
the option of the holder, (6) stamp companies account for the total number of stamps.
both issued and redeemed during the statutory period, and (7) that each savings book
contain the statement, "Trading Stamps are redeemable . . . only if offered for redemp-
tion within two years of the printed date of issue." See also, Neb. H.B. No. 442, 67thSess., Jan. 31, 1955; Colo. "Escheat Bill," '1955 Sess. (unpublished), on file in Duke
Law Library.
"'See note 77 infra.
" The theory that the funds maintained by the stamp companies as reserves for un-
redeemed consumer claims should inure to the state rests, to a great extent, upon the com-
mon law concepts of escheat.- Originally, the doctrine of escheat applied only 'to real
property and was inseparable from the concepts of feudal. tenure. HOLDSWORTH, A
HIsToRIcAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW, 33 (927), 1 POLLOCK AND MAIT-
LAND, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 19±3). Personal property, on the
other hand, was not considered subject to. escheat. Instead, it passed to the Crown
under the doctrine of bona vacantia upon the theory. that, as to abandoned property, the
Ciown's claim on behalf 'of society was more expedient and -equitable than that of
another. This latter doctrine, as an incident of sovereignty rather than feudal tenure,
was, in substance, early appropriated by state legislatures, limited only by state consti-
tutions and the fourteenth amendment. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S.
233, 240 (1944) ; United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 (1938) ; Security Savings Bank
v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (-9±3).
Whether this power of appropriation is exercised in the form of escheat legislation,
which perfects in the state title to the unclaimed property, or in the form of abandoned
property legislation, which merely declares the state custodian, its purposes-to protect
and conserve property from depletion and depreciation, and to enhance alienability-
seem justified. Moreover, the interest which accrues to the state from the property while
in custody as well as its value upon escheat present ample grounds to support this legisla-
tion as a proper revenue measure. Accordingly, the states have extended their escheat
power beyond the objects of real and personal property to include such intangibles as
unpaid bank deposits, wages, principals of trusts, life insurance proceeds, stock certificates,
and unpaid dividends. See generally, Garrison, Escheat, .4bandoned Property 4cts and
Their Revenue Aspects, 35 Ky. L. J. 302 (1947); Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed
Property-A1 Proposed Model Act, 46 ILL. L. REV. 48 (1951) i Comment, I* STAN. L.
REV. 342 (1949) ; Notes, 27 IND. L. J. 113 (1951); 43 ILL. L. REV. 709 (1948)5 26




of an escheat policy would seem to be proportional to the incidence of
nonredemption.
Unfortunately, the actual redemption rate of stamps is impossible to
determine under the companies' present method of operation, because it
cannot be known what portion of the stamps presently outstanding are
lost or destroyed, and what portion will eventually be redeemed, nor,
whether the stamp redeemed today was issued last week or ten years
ago." It would seem that the redemption rate would vary proportion-
ally with the size of the company, its facilities for redemption, the quality
of its premiums, and other factors affecting the popularity of its stamps
and, therefore, the inclination of the purchaser to save them for redemp-
tion. Even though the average rate of redemption for all companies
cannot be known, it appears certain that under the present system, sub-
stantial sums are funneled annually into stamp-company treasuries as a
result of nonredemption.78 The size of these sums would seem sufficient
to warrant judicial approval of escheat legislation.
Notwithstanding the existence of a proper legislative policy, however,
it is possible that certain constitutional limitations may prevent successful
application of the proposed escheat legislation. Some insight into the
nature of these limitations is afforded by an examination of the one
attempt that has been made to escheat obligations measured by un-
redeemed stamps,79 although this effort was made not under an escheat
statute specifically directed at stamps, but, rather, pursuant to a general
personal property escheat provision.
In 1955, proceedings, now pending trial and decisions, were instituted
in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey against
the Sperry & Hutchinson Company to escheat "cash obligations" owed
by the company on unredeemed trading stamps issued prior to certain
statutory periods on the ground that they represent abandoned prop-
77'Estimates as to the rate of stamp redempion vary widely. For example: The
Sperry '& Hutchinson Company claims 94% redemption; Southern Premium Company
of Atlanta claims 6o%; the retailers argue that "fly-by-nighters" redeem at a rate of
5-o% but that the redemption rate for all stamps is 6o%. Business Week, May g,
1956, p. 435 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1S, 1953, p. 8.
"s One commentator has estimated that of the $490 million in sales made annually
to retailers by approximately 370 trading stamp companies, at an estimated redemption
rate of 95%, $25 million in unredeemed stamps inure to the companies. VREDENBURG,
op'. cit. supra note i, at 34-36. Upon the basis of 6o% redemption, the rate argued
by the retailers, as applied to the x956 estimate of $6oo million in stamp sales, $240
million in nonredemption forfeitures would.inure to stamp companies. Cf. note 77supra.
, State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., Docket No. C 1048-54, Docket No. C 1049-54
(Chancery Div., Super. Ct. of N.J. x956).
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erty.80 In response, the company has contended"' that the obligations
represented by unredeemed stamps are not proper objects of escheat, and
that" if an escheatable object does, in fact, exist, it must be the stamp
itself. It is argued that these obligations are not fixed and definite--i.e.,
"debts"--a characteristic of shares of stock, unpaid dividends, insurance
policies and unclaimed bank deposits, all admittedly subject to escheat.,2
For it is reasoned that once the company has delivered the stamps to the
retailer with a promise to redeem them, the contract is fully executed
as between the company and the retailer, and the consumner who ulti-
mately receives the stamps in connection with the purchase of goods be-
comes, in effect, a third party beneficiary of the contract.83 As such, the
consumer is said initially to possess not a direct right against the company,
but merely a right residing in the stamp itself which becomes fixed only
upon presentation of a requisite number of stamps to the company for
redemption. 84  Moreover, the company's initial obligation to the con-
sumer, as stipulated in the company-retailer contract, is not definite since
under its terms the company has expressly reserved the right to alter the
redemption value of the stamp at any time prior to the presentation
of the stamps for redemption.85 Thus, as the company contends, it seems
clear that the obligation to redeem trading stamps, unlike the well-
"The proceedings against Sperry & Hutchinson Company were initiated under two
statutes. The first action, Dockei No. C 1048-54, was brought pursuant to the Cus-
todial Escheat Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 37-29 (1952), which provides that the state may
take into its protective custody property consisting of cash, dividends, interest or wages
owed by a corporation organized or doing business within the state which belongs to a
person who remains unkndwn or whose property remains unclaimed for a period of
five successive years. And, upon the the expiration of the period of protective custody,
the state is authorized to commence escheat proceedings. Although the Chancery
Division dismissed the state's complaint under this statute on the grounds that it applies
only to dividends payable upon capital stock, interest payable upon formal instruments
of indebtedness, and wages, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on appeal, held it applica-
ble to funds held by the company. State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., -N.J. -, 127 A.2d
169 (1956). The second action, Docket No. C 1049-54, was initiated under the
Personal Property Escheat Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. zA: 37-14 (1952), which authorizes
the direct escheat to the state of any personal property, intangibles as well as tangibles,
which has remained abandoned for a period of fourteen years prior to the commence-
ment of the escheat proceedings.
"a In its answer to the New Jersey complaint, Sperry & Hutchinson set forth thirteen
defenses, only a few of which are considered in this paper.
"See note 76 supra.
Proposed Escheat Legislation Concerning the Sperry & Hutchinson Cash Discount
Stamps, New York; Sperry & Hutchinson Company, p. 3 (unpublished), on file in Duke
Law Library.
"Id. at 4.
"y See Sperry & Hutchinson contract, Form 22 M Rev. Sept. io, 1956, on file in
Duke Law Library.
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recognized objects of escheat; is not a "debt" to the consumer. If the
unredeemed stamps alone represent the extent of the company's obliga-
tion to the consumer, the state's sole legally effective method of escheat
would be to present such stamps to the company for redemption. This
would obviously be a completely unsatisfactory and impractical arrange-
ment for the state. Accordingly, if the company's rationale is adopted,
the New Jersey court will be impelled to hold the present escheat pro-
visions inapplicable.""
Even assuming that the obligation itself, rather than the stamp,
constitutes a proper object of escheat, the question remains whether the
New Jersey statute could be constitutionally applied, since the state
would encounter considerable difficulty in establishing which unredeemed
stamps, if any, were issued prior to the statutory period. Moreover,
an arbitrary estimate of this amount would undoubtedy be assailed
as an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power. Thus, it is clear
that unless the typical personal property escheat statute is amended,
any attempt to levy upon a stamp company's reserves for unredeemed
stamps will probably be unsuccessful.
Under the recently proposed escheat legislation, with its compre-
hensive provisions drafted specifically to apply to stamp companies, 87 it
"' It seems clear that a fundamental obstacle to a constitutional application of the
New Jersey eseheat statutes is that, in addition to the impossibility of determining thb
number of outstanding stamps, the company has retained not only the power to alter the
value of the stamps, but also, is obligated only to redeem them in merchandise. On
the other hand, the fact that the statute, as applied, would in effect modify the company-
retailer contract by requiring the former to redeem stamps actually not presented for
redemption, would not appear to prevent a valid escheat. For example, in Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore 333 U.S. 541 (1948), the state of New York
sought to obtain custody of life insurance proceeds payable to New York beneficiaries on
policies issued by a foreign corporation upon lives of New York residents. The in-
surer.contended that the statute transformed into a liquidated obligation one that was
contingent upon surrender of the policy with proof of death, and, moreover, that it
deprived it of certain defenses which might be employed to bar the beneficiary's claim,
all in violation of the contracts clause. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court sustained
the New York court's declaration of custody and stated that although the insured "may
find it more difficult to establish other defenses ... we do not regard the statute as uncon-
stitutional because of these enforced variations from the policy provisions.... The fact
that claimants against the company would be required to comply with certain policy
conditions does not affect our conclusion. The state may more properly be beneficiary of
abandoned property than another person .... When the state undertakes the protection
of abandoned claims, it would be beyond a reasonable requirement to compel the state
to comply with the conditions that may be quite proper as between the contracting
parties. The state -is acting as conservator, not a party to a contract." 333 U.S. at
546-47. Cf. Anderson National Bank v. Tuckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944) ; note 76
sunrar
.; See note ,t supra.
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is highly doubtful that any of the objections urged in the New Jersey
case *could effectively be raised. First, the proposed bills uniformly
specify that the "cash" value of the stamp be printed on its face and
that redemption be provided for in nominal numbers,88 thus enabling
a particular consumer to demand redemption practically upon receipt of
the stamps. This provision seems dearly to obviate the objection that
the obligations represented by stamp reserves are not fixed and definite8 9
Moreover, other constitutional infirmities present in the New Jersey-
type escheat statute as applied to the trading-stamp situation also seem
substantially eliminated by the recent bills. The new proposals typically
provide that the date and state of issue must appear on the face of the
stamp9 0 and that the stamp companies must periodically account for the
number of stamps issued and unredeemed during the statutory period."
Thus, an accurate assessment may be made of a particular company's
escheatable obligations, and the argument that it is unreasonable to re-
quire the companies to ascertain those subject to escheat is effectively re-
butted. 2
A further constitutional objection may be entered, however, with
respect to the relatively short period made available for the redemption
by the new proposals.93 Since the sine qua non of traditional escheat
0' For example, Ky. H. B. No. 4, 4th Sess., April 9, 1956, provided that "[a]ny
Issuer or agent for redemption of trading stamps shall . . . redeem . . . or cause [such
stamps] to be redeemed either in goods or in cash . . . at the option of the holder...
and any number of such trading stamps shall be so redeemed at the stated value as
printed upon the face thereof . . . provided however, thatthe aggregate stated value
of . . . stamps offered for redemption be not less than ten cents."
" The cash option provision appears to eliminate the difficulty, inherent in the typical
personal property escheat statute, of determining the amount of stamp obligations sub-
ject to escheat. For, although the company may retain the power to alter the redemp-
tion value of stamps in terms of merchandise, its cash value would be fixed immediately
upon distribution to the consumer. See note 86 supra. See also, note 103 infra.
00 See note 74. supra.
" As an example of the typical accounting provision, Ky. H. B. No. 4, 4 th Sess.,
April 9, 1956, provided that: "Each issuer and each agent for redemption of trading
stamps shall.., maintain records of: (a) The value of trading stamps . . . distributed by
such person within the state. (b) The date of issue. (c) The value of trading stamps
redeemed . . . within two years after their date of issue, so that records will disclose
accurately the total value of trading stamps so . . . distributed within this state which
are not presented for redemption within two years after their date of. issue."
Moreover, the requirement that the date and state of issue appear on the stami
precludes the objection on the part of* stamp companies that they may be required
submit to a "double" redemption, since once a particular stamp obligation has
escheated, the company's obligation to the consumer ceases.
,' In the proposed bills, the period available for redemption typically ranges from
one to five years. See, e.g., N.Y. Assembly Bill No. 3977, Feb. 2s, t956 (authorizing
the state to take custody of stamps unredeemed for five years) ; Ky. H. B. No. 4, 4 th
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legislation is the existence of abandoned or unclaimed property,94 a con-
clusive presumption that aill stamps issued and not redeemed one or two
years prior to a particular escheat proceeding are abandoned might be
deemed an unconstitutional deprivation of the stamp-saver's property.9 5
Yet, the proposed legislative requirements that notice of this limited
period be given to the consumer9" and that redemption be made available
in nominal amounts97 would seem substantially to mitigate this con-
tention.98
Even assuming that the proposed legislation fully satisfies consti-
tutional requirements necessary to escheat the obligations represented by
unredeemed stamps, the stamp companies may still allege that its applica-
tion would so diminish their profits as to prohibit their operations and
thus exceed the legitimate scope of the police power. An argument
by the companies that they would be so injured solely by the loss of non-
redemption forfeitures would be unlikely, however, for this would tacitly
admit that stamp companies could not survive but for gains not de-
servedly theirs. Rather, the companies would assert that profitable op-
Sess., April 9, 1956 (7 year escheat) 5 Colorado "Escheat Bill," 1955 Sess. (unpublished),
on file at Duke Law Library (one year escheat).
9
' See note 76 supra.
"'Arguably, whether a given statutory period of redemption would be unreasonable
should depend upon the length of time necessary for the average stamp-giving con-
sumer, in the process of normal purchasing, to amass a number of stamps sufficient to
acquire any of the items offered by the stamp company for redemption. However,
the cash-option provision would seem effectively to rebut this argument.
8 Notice to the consumer of the period during which stamps may be presented to the
stamp company for redemption would generally be required by the proposed bills to
appear both at the place where the stamp is distributed to the customer and in the
customer's stamp saving book. See, e.g., the Kentucky proposal, note 74 supra.
Furthermore, such notice would seem to be even more satisfactory than that provided
by personal service upon the debtor and service by publication to the creditor whicht
was held sufficient to alleviate due process objections in Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 34! U.S. 428, 434-35 (195). See also, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S.
182, 288 (9-3).
9' See note 74 supra.
" A final constitutional objection to the escheat of stamp company obligations which
was raised in the New Jersey case is that, since such obligations are allegedly embodied
in the stamps themselves, only those having a situs within the state seeking to escheat
would be subject to that state's jurisdiction. And, thus, since it is impossible to determine
the location of outstanding stamps, the state would be without jurisdiction to escheat.
Although it is well settled that as to tangibles there can be but one situs and therefore
one state with jurisdiction to escheat, the situs of intangibles is considered to be a "fiction"
and thusimposes no limitation to a state's escheat power. Instead, the power to eacheat
intangibles "exists through the state's jurisdiction of the parties whose dealings have
created the chose in action ... " Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 440
(1951).
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erations would be impossible because of the burden imposed by the
machinery necessary to escheat.
Unquestionably, the provision most crucial to the validity of escheat
legislation and most onerous to the stamp companies is the one requiring
that the date and state of issue appear on each stamp99 and imposing on
the company the responsibility of checking the date of stamps presented
for redemption.' In determining whether this provision would un-
reasonably hamper a stamp company's activities, a court would balance
the demonstrated extra expense to the company against the strength of
the policy of escheat. While the effect of this expense would be accorded
substantial consideration, it nevertheless seems unlikely that it would
be held to outweigh the countervailing economic justification for escheat.
Even if a court were to decide that, cumulatively, the escheat pro-
visions impose a prohibitory burden or that the statute is not a valid exer-
cise of the state's escheat power, an important question would remain as
to whether the entire scheme of the escheat provisions ought to be
stricken or whether certain ones should be nullified and others retained.
Irrespective of the basis of decision, it would appear appropriate to re-
move only those provisions most injurious to the companies and allow
the remainder to retain effectiveness, provided, of course, that a valid
legislative object, independent of escheat, could be found. Thus, the
requirement that the date and state of issue be printed upon each stamp
and that the company ascertain the date of issue of all redeemed stamps
could dearly be held invalid, while the provision requiring that all
stamps state a "cash" value and that redemption be made available in
nominal amounts in cash or merchandise at the option of the holder
might be upheld.
As to the cash option provision, there is dearly a valid legislative
object, independent of escheat. This provision would not only reduce
"Without this provision, stamp companies might be required to submit to a "double
redemption." See note 92 supra.
...A checking of the stamps by the companies upon redemption for date of issue
would be necessary to prevent a double escheat, that is, the redemption of an obliga-
tion already escheated. The weight of this burden would depend upon the method
of checking devised by the company. Of course, a company could simply fail to check
and write off double redemptions as a type of bad debt. Companies might argue, as
well, that because of an escheat-statute in one state, a burden is imposed up6n it to
bear the expense of checking elsewhere to prevent a second redemption. However, it is
just as likely that stamps issued elsewhere might be redeemed in the state seeking to
escheat, thus reducing the amount inuring to the latter upon escheat. Since, on the
whole, the company suffers no loss, the argument that checking elsewhere is necessary
to prevent a loss would seem to be insubstantial.
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the incidence of nonredemption, 10 1 but would also tend to eliminate the
injury to consumers resulting from stamp-company control of the stamp
"price" and quality of its redemption premiums.102 Although the com
pany would still have this control,103 it could not afford to "price" its
premiums above the prevailing market rates or the consumer would be
inclined to demand redemption in cash and purchase the premium
product elsewhere.
While escheat and related provisions would inure to the advantage of
consumers and the public, they would be of little direct value to the
injured retailers for whom little short of absolute prohibition of the
stamp industry's activities will be sufficiently helpful. Of course, to
the extent that regulatory legislation would harrass and curtail stamp-
company operations, it would alleviate some degree of retailer injury,
an end dearly contemplated by those advocating such legislation.
V
FAIR TRADE LAWS AND TRADING STAMPS
Retailers, in their attack on trading stamps, have also sought to
place the stamp-giving retailer at a competitive price disadvantage by
invokinIg the fair trade laws.. 4  The argument here advanced is that the
101 The fact that the consumer would no longer be required to save several books
of stamps in order to secure the redemption premium, as is typically the case under
present practices, added to whatever psychological effect there may be in the fact that the
stamps themselves would be tantamount to cash, would undoubtedly effect some reduction
in the rate of nonredemption.
02 Such injury to consumers would be most likely to occur in an area where stamps
are well established and the stamp saving habit is inculcated in the consumer since a
decrease in premium values would, in all probability, not be prevented by a proportionate
decrease in consumer demand.
'10" The apparent retention -by the company of the power to assign a cash value to
stamps is a serious defect of the proposed escheat bills, for a company could place
a very small cash value on the stamps and a much higher value on redemption mer-
chandise. Such a tactic would largely frustrate the policy of escheat for the amount
owing to the state for unredeemed stamps is based on their stated cash value. Probably
the most satisfactory method of eliminating this infirmity would be to provide that the
cash value of a stamp could be no less than the price at which the company issued it
to the retailer.
As to the application of fair trade laws to trading stamps, see generally, Comment,
Trading Stamps: Challenge to Regulation of Price Competition, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 242
(x956) ; Notes, 63 HA&V. L. REV. 366 (1949) ; 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 376 (xgjs) ; 25
TuL. L. REV. 525 (1951); 66 YALE L. J. 436 (1957); 22 A.L.R.zd 122 (.952).
Attempts have also been made to apply "sales-below-cost" acts and other price regulatory
statutes such as cigarette and gasoline sales acts to the retail distribution of trading
stamps, but with little success. See io5 U. PA. L. REv. 242, 254-6o (1956). There
appears to be little concerted action by retailers to use these statutes for the purpose of
regulating trading-stamp operations. Rather, trading stamps ordinarily become involved
'in fazritrade-litigaton-.when a manufacturer or a retailer initiates proceedings against
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giving of trading stamps with a fair-traded item at its fair trade price is a
prohibited form of price cutting or concession. Generally, however, ex-
cept where fair trade statutes specifically refer to stamps0 5 or coupons, 08
this statutory weapon has been rendered ineffective by judicial interpre-
tation that the distribution of trading stamps is not violative of the fair
trade laws. 7 However, these decisions are less important than the
inherent inadequacy of these laws as protective devices for non-stamp-
giving retailers.
If fair trade laws were uniformly applicable to the distribution of
trading stamps with fair-traded items, the stamp-giving retailer would
have two alternatives other than abandonment of his stamp plan. He
another retailer who distributes stamps with goods sold at the minimum fair trade price,
or as in some recent litigation, when a manufacturer brings suit for injunctive relief
against a violating retailer who defends by charging that the manufacturer has "un-
clean hands" in that it allows other ietailers to sell its products at the minimum price and
to distribute trading stamps as well. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter &
Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956) ; 66 YALE L. J. 436 (957).
'0' The Wisconsin statute specifically mentions stamps. Wis. STAT. § 100.15(z)(1953).
... Lambert Pharmical Co. v. Roberts Bros., ig5o Trade Cas. 62669 (Ore. Cir.
Ct.); cf. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 3o N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.zd 177 (1950) (cash-
register tape redemption plan held within the New York statute although this provision
specifys "coupons.") See Notes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 366 (x949) ; 6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
376 (19s) ; 25 TuL. L. REV. 525 (x95x).
.0. The usual rationale is thatstamps represent a "cash discount" rather than a price
reduction. Gever v. American Stores Co., -Pa. -, 127 A.zd 694 (x956). It has
been suggested, however, that "labeling the stamps a 'cash discount' settles nothing, for
... such treatment represents nothing more than seller's bookkeeping procedure." 1o5
U. PA. L. REv. 242, 249 (956). Other theories marshalled in support of the majority
holding that stamps are not within the statute are that stamps are.a. promotional device
similar to advertising and that fair trade laws were not intended to cover trading stamps
as they were enacted to prevent "loss leader" selling, a practice not involved in the
trading-stamp operation. Cf. Note, 63 HARv. L. REV. 366 (1949)- See Note, 66
YALE L. J. 436, 441-42 (1957); Also, it has been reasoned that even if there were
a violation, it would not be enjoinable since it is de ininimus non curat lex. Bristol-
Myers Co. v. Lit. Bros. Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939). The validity of these last
two conclusions might well depend upon which interests the statutes were designed to pro-
tect, the retailer's interest in price maintenance, or the manufacturer's interest in protecting
the good will of his product. If the later view is adopted, even the de ninimus argument
appears to be sound; however, if the former is deemed to control, then the distribution
of stamps might well be within the purview of the statute. While the controlling theory
is that the purpose of fair trade laws is to protect the reputation of the manufacturer's
product, this rationale should be recognized as having been adopted ex necessitate to
uphold these statutes as' agains constitutional challenge. Old Dearborn Distributing
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). Moreover, it appears that the
acts were sponsored mainly by retailers and were probably intended primarily for their
benefit. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 99 0939)-
However, whatever the theoretical conflict, because of the waning judicial tolerance
of fair trade and the public policy against its extension, [United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956)] a strict construction of fair trade legislation, which
excludes trading stamps from its scope, would seem entirely justifiable.
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might either raise the price of fair-traded items above the minimum in an
amount equal to the value of the stamp as fixed by the company, or he
might decline to give stamps on fair-traded items when sold at the mini-
mum price. If the price of these goods were raised, consumers might
easily recognize the price increase, however slight, because competition
keeps their price at a minimum elsewhere and because the manufacturer
often advertises his fair-trade price. If consumers related the higher
price to the giving of stamps, they would likely infer that stamps mean
higher prices on all goods in the store and thus become disillusioned
with the stamp saving unless they would be persuaded that higher prices
would be charged on fair trade items only. On the other hand, a re-
tailer's refusal to give trading stamps-with fair trade goods would not
necesarily motivate consumers to go elsewhere. Although this practice
would cause some dissatisfaction on the part of stamp-saving consumers,
it 'is unlikely that they would prefer to purchase these goods in a non-
stamp-giving store or that any but a slight disaffection for stamps would
result.'08 Therefore, even if the fair trade laws uniformly applied, they
would be of little protection to non-stamp-giving merchants. Because the
majority of such statutes do not apply, however, and because of the de-




While the possibilities of state regulation of the stamp industry have
been discussed, because the industry's development presages important
cumulative consequences for the national economy, some discussion of
the bases and policy of possible federal regulation would appear also to
be appropriate.
Federal regulation might emanate from the Federal Trade Com-
mission in their administration of existing statutes or from additional con-
gressional legislation. While the prospect of congressional action is
presently highly doubtful,' ° regulatory efforts by the Federal Trade
08 However, in at least one area of retail trade, i.e., drug stores, neither raising prices
nor refusing to give stamps on fair traded items would be satisfactory alternatives. If
the latter method were employed, since a high proportion of the items merchandised in
such a store are fair traded, the segregation of purchases and the frequent refusal to
give stamps might well effect an appreciable customer dissatisfaction with stamp saving.
"' The Senate Select Committee on Small Business has announced its intention to
investigate the trading-stamp problem to determine whether "small business is being
hurt" by stamps. Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1956, p. x.
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Commission appear more imminent in the light of the Commission's re-
cently concluded investigation of selected industry members.110
At the outset, it must be observed that the Commission is presented
with two fundamentally different approaches to regulation of the in-
dustry. The Commission may either determine that the trading stamp
is illegal per se as an unfair competitive instrument and prohibit its use
in commerce, or it may treat the stamp industry as legitimate and attempt
to regulate certain practices of its members.
Quite conceivably, the Commission could conclude that trading stamp
operations constitute "unfair methods of competition in commerce" and
prohibit them under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.""
In determining the legitimacy of these operations under this section, the
same economic considerations that would be weighed by state legislatures
would presumably influence the Commission. However, the Commis-
sion, is subject to certain limitations not encountered by legislatures 1 2
since it operates under a statutory directive to eliminate "unfair methods
of competition," which both linguistically and traditionally is narrower in
scope than the power of a state legislature to enact measures for the
"general welfare.". 3  While at one time this term in section 5 of the Act
110 It has recently been reported that the Federal Trade Commission has decided not
to proceed against the trading stamp industry as illegitimate per se. However, several
complaints have been filed with the Commission purportedly charging some membeis
of the industry with certain deceptive practices in advertising, price discriminations
violative of the Robinson-Patman Act, and exclusive dealing contracts with retailers
allegedly in violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act. As one agency official commented,
"we will not ban the race track, but only make it operate legally." Wall Street Journal,
Apr, 3, 1957, P. I.
11 38 STAT. 719 (9-4), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952) provides that: "[u]nfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful." See generally, BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1932); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1974); MCFARLAND,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION (1933); Ely, The Work of the Federal Trade Commission, 7
Wis. L. REv. 195 (1932); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1936) i
Handler, Unfair Competition, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1940) i Montague, Unfair
Methods of Competition, 25 YALE L. J. 2o (i955); Watkins, An .4ppraisal of the
Work of the Federal Trade Commission, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (1932) ; Watkins,
Economic Implications of Unfair Competition, 2 IOWA L. REV. 263 (1936).
..3 For other distinctions between a state legislature and the Federal Trade Comn..s-
sion related to the lesser power of the Commission see, MCFARLAND, op. cit. supra note
111, at 21.
.1. The common law business tort of "unfair competition," though developed from
diverse sources, has as its nbcleus trade mark and trade name appropriation which
became fused into an actionable wrong around the turn of the century. Chafee, Unfair
Competition, 53 HARv. L. REV. s±89, 5296 (1940). Attempts to analyze this tort
resulted in the formulation of the following elements: injury by way of loss of prospec-
tive trade, causation between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's harm, and the lack of a
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was deemed to encompass only practices actionable at common law prior
to the passage of the Act in 1914, for more than two decades the Com-
mission's power has been held to extend to the prohibition of activities
found to be "unfair" as against "public policy."11 4 Despite this theoretical
amplitude of judicially approved power, the Commission has moved with
caution in this area.
The requirement of a judicial finding that a practice sought to be
social and economic justification for the defendant's conduct. Holmes, Privilege, Malice
and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1 (189.). Such an analysis is of little value because it
provides no guide for the solution to the most important question: which uses are socially
and economically unjustified? Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE
L. J. s (sgx9). Due to this difficulty, common law precedents tend to be restricted to
clear violations of basic business morality. See generally NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION AND TRADEMARKS (4 th ed. 1947); PROssER, ToRTS 745 (2d ed. 1955),
Callmanil, What is Unfair Competition?, a8 GIo. L.J. 585 (1940), Handler,
Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1936) ; Rodgers, Unfair Competition, 17
MICH. L. REV. 490 (.99).
"" When Congress passed § 5 of the Feedral Trade Commission Act, the meaning
it collectively ascribed to this term was a source of great controversy. One writer dis-
cerned eight separate meanings used in the committee reports and debates. Montague,
Unfair Methods of Competition, 25-YALE L. J. 2o, 29 (igis). However, it has been
pointed out numerous times that Congress adopted the phrase "unfair methods of compe-
tition" as a broader and more flexible term than its common law counterpart, "unfair
competition." Handler, Unfair Competition, 8 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 399 (1940).
Despite a then widespread conclusion that Congress had adopted a general declaration
condemning unfair practices and leaving to the Commission the determination of which
practices were unfair, [McFARLAND, op. cit. supra note iii, at 42] the first important
decision from the Supreme Court deemed that "it was for the courts, and not the Coin-
mission, ultimately to determine" what the phase means. It is "clearly inapplicable to
practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by
deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression.. . ." FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (192o).
This decision was regarded by the Commission as limiting applicability of the term to
conduct actionable at common law. F.T.C. Ann. Rep. 7 (1923). FTC v. R. F.
Keppel & Bro, Inc., a9s U.S. 304 (1934), however, is the foundation of the more
liberal interpretation of the Commission's powers, in part because of the enunciation of
the doctrine that "unfair methods of competition" includes acts which are in contraven-
tion of "public policy." Because traces of this doctrine can be found in earlier cases,
[FTC v. Beechnut Packing Co. a57 U.S. 44 (1922)], the most important aspect of the
Keppel decision is its shift of emphasis from precedent to a broader standard and its im-
plication of greater administrative freedom in expansion of the unfair practices concept.
According to one writer, "the revolutionary change of attitude of the court ... virtually
consigned the definition in the Gratz case to oblivion." Handler, Unfair Competition, 2 1
IOWA L. REV. 175, 245, 243 (1936). While this decision freed the Commission from
the restraining precedents of common law, the problem of determining the content of the
"public policy" doctrine still remains. The logical conclusion to be drawn is that
while applicable case decisions and statutes are not necessary to a finding of unfair
competition, because of the necessity of judicial control, it is required that there be some
authoritative indication of a public policy against the allegedly "unfair" practice.
Whether such an indication would have to consist of statutes, decisions, or even emanate
from an organ of government is uncertain, but likely. Scholarly opinions of economists
in.a complex field, or even the findings of the Commission itself made after extensive
investigation of the practice probably would be insufficient. See note t2as infra.
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prohibited is violative of established "public policy" is not a formal one,
but is rather a doctrine devised to operate as a check on the substantive
power of the Commission."' The context of this term is traditionally
supplied by reference to statutes and case decisions and accepted con-
cepts of business morality. Thus, in the decisions prohibiting the use of
punchboards in the sale of merchandise, the closest precedents analogous
to trading stamps," 6 numerous state statutes declaring certain types of
lotteries illegal and ethical restrictions against gambling were relied
upon."'
It is difficult, however, to discover an established "public policy"
with respect to trading stamps. There are only a few state statutes of
importance concerning stamps and they do not prohibit the issuance of
stamps but merely impose a tax on stamp-company operations." 8 More-
"'Although it may be argued that the "public policy" doctrine is a standard re-
quired by constitutional law to keep the Commission within ascertainable administrative
bounds, it would seem that the statutory phrase "unfair methods of competition" is in
itself a sufficient standard to satisfy constitutional requirements. Instead, the doctrine
appears to be a compromise between a judicial carte blanche to the Commission and a
retention of the earlier practice of obvious substitution by the court of what it con-
sidered "unfair" for the Commission's findings of unfairness as a fact.
.. The Supreme Court in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 0934)
concluded that merchandizing of candy by use of punchboards was a proper subject of
interdiction by the Commission under the rubric of "unfair methods of competition." See
Note, The Prohibition of Gambling Devices by the Federal Trade Conzssion, 47
COLUM. L. R. 647 (1947); 4z ILL. L. REV. 384 (1947).
Traditional definitions of a lottery under state statutes and decisions require as
elements: consideration, chance and prize. Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws, 45
HARV. L. REv. 1196 (1932). Such a definition would appear inapplicable to trading
stamps because the right to the premium is relatively fixed and absolute upon receipt
of the stamps, and does not rest upon an element of "chance." However, the element
of chance may enter in determining the amount of consideration which is paid for
the stamps, i.e., in terms of higher prices. The mere fact that merchandise is given
to all who pay consideration has been held insufficient to save merchandising devices when
the right to the extra prize depended upon chance. FTC v. F. A. Martoccio Co., 87 F.zd
561 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 691 (1937)- Since prize'and consideration
have thus been assimilated, one being a part of the other, it would appear logically
possible to find a lottery when the amount of consideration paid for stamps was based
upon chance. However, whether this amount paid would be "consideration," or whether
it is based upon "chance" or shopping skill are related questions. While admittedly, this
may not be a sufficient rationale for the application of state lottery statutes, stamps might
still be condemned as being in the nature of a lottery.
... "Without inquiring whether, as respondent contends, the criminal statutes imposing
penalties on gambling, lotteries and the like fail to reach this particular practice [the
"break and take" device used in sale of penny candy], it is clear that this practice is of
the sort which the common law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to publi,
policy." Stone, J., in FTC v. R. F. Keppel Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (934)'
"" Statutes of Kansas, Washington, and Tennessee impose high taxes on the
operation. See notes 9, 26, 71, supra. Nevertheless, it is clear that the legislative intent
was to prohibit the activities of the stamp companies and, as such, these enactments would
qualify as expressions of public policy.
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over, there is a .multitude of state cases declaring stamp prohibition
statutes invalid,119 and perhaps a negative inference may be drawn from
the fact that state legislatures in numerous states have recently failed
to enact new prohibitory statutes.120 Thus, while such recognized gauges
as statutes and court decisions do not, on the whole, support a conclusion
that trading stamps are violative of an established public policy, arguably
they, alone, are inadequate indices of the public interest. For, when
the subject under investigation is as complex as the trading stamp opera-
tion, a penetrating economic study and analysis is a condition precedent
to the ascertainment of the public interest. Were an economic test alone
to be adopted, however, courts would, to a great extent, be bound by
'the Commission's findings based upon economic study and argument,
and the doctrine would no longer operate as a control over the Com-
mission's power.12 1  But in the "gradual process of inclusion and ex-
clusion"' 22 of the Commission's section 5 power, it is but a short, though
"' See note 31 supra. While admittedly a majority of state court opinions dealing
with anti-stamp legislation have held such statutes unconstitutional, the fact that legis-
latures in more than twenty states saw fit to adopt such legislation deserves some weight
in the ascertainment of whether a sufficient public policy against stamps exists. In
accordance with prezent concepts of deference to the legislative function of policy formu-
lation in economic affairs, these statutes might be deemed to have greater weight than
the expressions of the local judiciaries which disapproved of them, especially since the
Supreme Court in the Ratt case arrived at a conclusion incompatible with these state
court decisions. However, the mere age of these expressions of legislative intent and
judicial sentiment may render both less significant as bases for ascertainment of a present
public policy.
20 See note 67 supra. In 1955, only two of twenty-six legislatures to which bills
adversely affecting stamps were proposed adopted such legislation. However, efforts by
retail groups to obtain legislation have been instituted on a vigorous scale in the 1957
legislative sessions. Already Tennessee has adopted a severe tax statute. See note 71
Pil While it is not presently to be expected that the federal courts would approve an
economic test per se, respectable arguments could be marshalled in behalf of such adop-
tion. In other realms of the Commission's jurisdiction, as for example the "basing point"
cases under the Robinson-Patman Act, the courts have relied heavily upon the economic
findings of the Commission even though economists were in disagreement on the subject.
See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726-27 (1948). It was not there
necessary to show that the state legislatures disapproved of the practice, for it was too
complex, and it is hardly clear that the basing point system, even though controversial,
was contrary to basic business morals. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that economic
analysis carries considerable weight in Commission-prosecuted cases under the Sherman
Act and yet the statutory formulas there are no less vague than under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. Therefore, judicial shift in emphasis from standards of precedent and
morals to economic analysis in unfair-practice cases would neither be unusual nor un-
justified in the light of the Comimssion's extensive knowledge and general experience.
""Undoubtedly, "Unfair Methods of Competition" has a.broader meaning than that
given to "unfair competition" at comrpon law. But, "[i]t belongs to that class of
phrases which do not admit of precise definition . . . the meaning and application 'of
which must be derived by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."
Sutherland, J., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (93).
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important, judicial step to accord less significance to the statutory and
decisional background and to view contemporary economic analysis as
more persuasive. Under such a combination test, the basis of some
decisions upholding prohibitory legislation, plus a finding of a tendency
toward public deception in values, added to a dear showing of sub-
stantial injury to non-stamp-giving retailers might be deemed indicative
of a "public policy" justifying the prohibition of trading stamps. 123
If the Commission does not attempt to prohibit the use of trading
stamps, it may still elect to regulate certain practices of the stamp com-
panies and, for this purpose, treat their basic operations as legitimate.
The two most obvious regulatory methods which the Commission could
adopt are the prohibition of stamp company advertising of "free" premi-
ums as a deceptive practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission -Act and the elimination of certain price discriminations through
application of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Generally, it has been held that the advertised offering of an article
as "free" is a deceptive practice within section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act' 24 when the person to whom the offer is made must, to
obtain the article, render an extra performance of a substantial nature,
... Assuming that trading stamps could be found an unfair competitive instrument,
there is a conceptual hurdle in enforcing "cease and desist" orders against the stamp
company in that the stamp-giving retailer rather than the company is the "unfair com-
petitor." In the Lottery Cases, after efforts to enforce orders against manufacturers
of goods who sold them packaged with gaming devices to retailers had failed, the Com-
mission successfully proceeded against the source of the evil, the manufacturers of the
devices. See Note, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 647 (19+7). Interesting questions, however,
exist as to enforcement against organizations using stamps other than stamp companiess
for example, large grocery chains which give stamps only at their own stores, cooperatives
formed by local groups which give and redeem their stamps on a non-profit basis as a
defense against outside stamp companies, or even the independent merchants who
redeem their cash register receipts. See note 14 supra. Irrespective of the economic
propriety of allowing such stamp operations to continue after prohibition of activities
of large stamp companies; it must be noted that the Commission's power is circumscribed
to prohibition of unfair methods of competition "in commerce." In FTC v. Bunte
Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) the Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, construed
words "in commerce" to be a lesser Congressional grant of power than "acts affecting
commerce," and refused to uphold the Commission's orders because the respondent dis-
tributed its punchboards only in the state of manufacture. It would appear, then, that th6
merchant who redeems his cash register receipts is clearly exempt as well as the local,
or even state-wide, cooperative, but the national chain store might still remain subject to
the Commission's jurisdiction despite the local nature of its distribution and redemption
of stamps because the stamps are tied to the chain's merchandise and this is sold across
state lines. It is unlikely,'however, that the Bunte Bros. decision would permit a stamp
company, prohibited from interstate distribution, to continue operations on a national
scale through locally incorporated subsidiaries.
"', Under the Wheeler-Lea amendment to. § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Commission is empowered to prohibit "deceptive acts and practices in commerce."
q2 STAT. 111 (1938), is U.s.C. § 45 (95 2).
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such as the purchase of other articles. It would appear that stamp com-
pany offers dearly fall within this extra performance test since the
stamps with which the "free" premiums are secured can only be obtained
through the pur:;hase of goods. The basis for the "extra performance"
rule is that the credulous might be misled into believing that the article
offered as "free" is a gratuity, not realizing that its cost might have been
added to the price charged for the article sold.'25 This rationale would
seemingly apply with special vigor to the stamp operation for it appears
that, generally, the consumer pays at least a portion of the cost of
stamps in the form of higher prices, and yet a large number of stamp-
saving consumers apparently believe otherwise. 2 ' Moreover, in the
typical,ffree" goods offer, it is at least possible for the offeror to absorb
compldtely the cost of the article offered as "free.' 2 7  The stamp com-
"' FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. i11 (1937) (encyclopedias offered
"free" upon purchase of supplements): Book-of-the-Month Club v. FTC, 202 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1953) (book offered "free" upon a promise to purchase four others). The
rendering of services as a condition to obtaining the "free" article has also been held
violative of § 5. Rosenblum v. FTC, 192 F.zd 392 (zd Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 905 (1952) ("free" dresses offered to prospective saleswomen, to be given in
proportion to the amount of dresses sold) ; Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103
(7 th Cir. 1946) ("free" suits offered to prospective salesmen).
Actually, the Commission has altered its policy concerning "free" goods offers con-
taining undertakings to purchase other goods. After the Standard Education case, supra,
the Commission limited its significance by holding that when an advertisement "clearly
and conspicuously" stated the extra requirements to obtain the "free" goods offered,
such advertisement was not a violation of the Act. Samuel Stores, Inc., 27 F.T.C. 88z
'(x938). Subsequently, the Commission by interpretive ruling took a broader view re-
quiring the article offered as "free" to be a "gift or gratuity" not subject to extra
conditions such as the "purchase of other merchandise." 16 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1949). The
Samuel Stores decision, supra, was then expressly overruled in the Book-of-the-Month-
Club case, supra. See Note, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 505 (1953). The Commission then
reversed itself again in Walter J. Black, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 5571 (1953), a decision which
appears to be a reversion to the Samuel Stores doctrine. See Note, 5z MICH. L. REv.
1249 (1954). While the Commission has vacillated in its solution of the problem, if it
determined that offers of "free" premiums constitute deceptive practices, its decision would
probably be upheld under the precedent of the Standard Education case, supra.
An advertisement need only have a tendency or capacity to deceive to be violative of
the Act. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 8i (1934). Actual deception is
not required. FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942). The "general popu-
lace" which might be deceived by such an offer necessarily includes the ignorant, un-
thinking and credulous. FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 116-17
(1937). While it may be obvious that an extra condition is required, it is often difficult
to determine whether the price for the attached article has been raised, this apparently
being the deception against which the extra performance rule is directed.
"' See note 44 supra.
" The fact that there is no price increase in the attached article which must be
purchased does not appear to be a defense. Book-of-the-Month Club v. FTC, 7o2
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953) (the sales price of the books required to be purchased was less
than the average retail price). Since some portion of the cost of trading stamps is
borne by the purchaser, a fortiori, stamp company offers should also be prohibited.
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panies, however, are powerless in this respect, and, in fact, are ignorant
of the extent to which retailers pass on the cost of stamps to consumers.
The second possible regulatory effort by the Commission is one of
several applications of the Robinson-Patman Act, which declares it illegal
for "any person ... to discriminate in price between purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality...., 2 8
The most important application of the Act 29 would be against indi-
vidual stamp companies for discrimination in price among stamp-giving
retailers.3 ° This discrimination may take one or a combination of three
forms: as between areas, a lowek price being offered in underdeveloped
stamp territories; 13 1 as between retailers in different types of trades; 132
and as between retailers on the basis of the quantity of stamps distributed,
228 38 STAT. 370 (914), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). See generally, AUSTIN,
PRICE DiSCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
(1950) ; WERNE, BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN LAW: A SYMPOSIUM (1938);
ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS (937); Price Discrimina-
tion and Price Cutting, .4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 271 (1937); COMMERCE CLEARING
HOUSE, SYMPOSIA ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1946, 1947 and 1948).
.2 Ther are two other possible applications of this Act affecting trading-stamp com-
panies. First, the Commission may proceed against manufacturers of premium mer-
chandise for granting discriminatory quantity discounts as between stamp companies.
If successfully applied, it would tend to place smaller stamp companies with less buying
power more on a parity with the larger companies, thus stimulating competition within
the industry. Although discrimination in price by a seller between buyers is pre-
sumptively illegal, the Act provides the seller with an affirmative defense if the dis-
crimination i4 justified by cost savings to him; quantity discounts are governed by this
rule. Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See Haslett, The Validity of
Quantity Discounts, C.C.H. ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 26 (1948).
The second application of this Act might be against individual stamp companies,
requiring them to maintain nation-wide uniformity in "pricing" premium merchandise
in terms of stamps. Thus, a company would be prevented from imposing a higher
'"price" in one area in order to offset losses incurred in another where its competitive
position is less secure.
"O It is apparently the practice of many of the larger stamp companies to distribute
their stamps to retailers at varying prices. INTERVIEW. See also, Business Week, May
59, 1956, P. 3.
... Though such a practice has a justifiable object, the price reduction would have
to be of a temporary nature to fall within a possible implied exception of "introductory
offer" to the Robinson-Patman Act.
'"2 The purpose to be served by such discrimination is uncertain, though it is possible
that a reason might exist for offering a lower price to retailers engaged in trades
involving low profit margins and strong price competition, where it would be difficult
for the retailer to raise prices to cover the cost of stamps, e.g., gasoline retailers. See
Comment,Trading Stamps, 24 TENN. L. REV. 557, 564 (1956). It is possible, though
unlikely, that this discrimiriation could be justified as a reasonable classification of cus-
tomers, but the "separate channel" theory justifying such classification appears to be
based upon circumstances inherent in traditional merchandise distribution, and not
present jn stamp transactions. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Con-
fusion: A4nother Look at Robinson-Patman, 6o YALE L. J. 929 (195).
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a lower price being offered to larger retailers.13 Of these practices, the
Commission would be most desirous of eliminating the discrimination
based on the amount of stamps distributed, for this disadvantages small
retailers vis-d-vis larger retailers in direct contravention of the purpose
of the statute.
However, an attempted application of the Act to these practices
would be well defended. First, it could be urged that the company-
retailer transaction is not a sale to a "purchaser," but a lease or license
authorizing the retailer to use the company's advertising services.1 34 In
the company's view, the retailer receives a package promotion which is
not a "commodity" within the meaning of the Act, and the stamps, while
"commodities," are intrinsically worthless bits of paper, absent a promise
of redemption." 5 Considering, however, that the price paid by the re-
tailer is measured by the quantity of stamps he receives, it is quite possible
that the Commission would choose to treat the company's argument as
merely placing a label of "license" on a contract of sale." The second
.SS If the Act applied to this practice, it is highly unlikely that the companies could
demonstrate a "cost justification" defense. See note 129 supra.
"' The stamp companies in their literature are consistently careful to describe the
transactions with the retailers who distribute the stamps as "license agreements," and
these retailers as "licensees." See e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Company contract, Form 22
M. Rev. Sept. zo, 1956, on file in Duke Law Library. The contract also carefully
stipulates that title to the stamps remains at all times in the stamp company, another
unilateral attempt to negate a possible implication that the stamps are "sold." Ibid.
... A somewhat similar argument was successful in the case of General Shale Products
Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942). There, a contract to
construct a building was deemed not to be a "commodity" within the Act though the bid
used to obtain the contract contained an allegedly discriminatory price for bricks, the
court refusing to consider the agreement divisible into two contracts, one for work and
labor and the other a sale of bricks.
"" The interpretation of the word "commodity" presents -a novel question. The
companies' argument is hopefully rested upon two previous interpretations. In Fleetwvay,
Inc. v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Service Co., 72 F.2d 76! (3rd Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935), which involved competitive price cutting between two
small bus companies and found to have been initiated by the plaintiff, the court, under
the original Clayton Act, held that bus tickets were not "commodities" within the statute.
See Note, 34 COLUM. L. REV. x566 (1934). Also, the Federal Trade Commission once
dismissed a complaint against publishers charged with quoting proportionally higher
prices for less than a full page of advertising space than for a full page on the grounds
that advertising space was not a "commodity" within the meaning of the Act and that
no injury had resulted from the practice. S CoNG. REc. 2336 (937). Despite these
previous interpretations, it seems clear that if a court were disposed to prohibit the dis-
crimination, neither the language of the statute nor the extant interpretative authority
would be a substantial impediment. An examination of the merits. of the defense is,
therefore, necessary. There may be justification for excluding transactions such as patent
licenses, contracts for personal services, and. agreements to furnish advertising, space, but
each'of these is easily distinguishable from the wholesale distribution to tens of thousands
of retailers of millions of identical, small-denominational choses in action under nationally
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defense is that since the companies, because of exclusive franchise ar-
rangements, do not sell to competing retailers, as between the latter,
competition is not diminished. While this may be true, this discrimina-
tion may tend substantially to lessen competition between stamp com-
panies,' 37 and, since the Act forbids discrimination "in any line of com-
merce"'" 8 where its effect may lessen competition,'39 it would appear
that this defense is also vitiated.
In sum, the Commission is faced with two alternatives-the absolute
prohibition of the stamp industry or regulation of certain practices of
some of its members. While prohibition is possible, it is unikely that the
Commission will initate such action since the magnitude and the popular
approval of the industry would militate against it. On the other hand,
it seems likely that the Commission could succeed in eliminating the
word "free" from stamp company advertising and possibly could pro-
hibit certain price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.
VII
CONCLUSION
Absent governmental intervention, it appears certain that trading
stamps will continue to play an important role in retail merchandising.
Although federal regulation is presently doubtful, continued attempts to
restrict stamp-company operations at the state level seem inevitable.
Here, outright prohibition, while conceivably constitutional under ex-
uniform contracts. Viewed as such, there is no more economic reason to exclude trading
stamps from the statute than to exclude distribution of cans of soup, for certainly the
public interest in the prevention of injury from price discrimination is proportionally as
great in one as the other.
... It is questionable whether this price discrimination between retailers may tend sub-
stantially to lessen competition.between stamp companies. The stamp companies would
urge that, because they are each restricted by exclusive franchise agreements not to sell
to competing retailers, competition between companies could not be lessened by this
practice. However, these contracts are of short-term duration, and if a company were
well developed in an area, the retailer could repeatedly be forced, at the end of each
term, to accept a smaller franchise area, with the effect that such contract would be
conditioned upon, rather than restrictive of, development of local monopoly power.
Since the Commission need only demonstrate that this practice may tend substantially
to lessen competition, and "may" has been interpreted as "possibly" rather than "prob-
ably," [Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 334 U.S. 37 (1948)] it would seem that the above
argument of the companies would not preclude this inference.
gS8 38 STAT. 370 (1914), IS U.S.C. § -3(a) (1952).
'8 While the great bulk of Robinson-Patman cases concern price discrimination
which is alleged to reduce competition between the seller's customers, a discrimination
which injuries competition between sellers is also prohibited. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 14z
F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., 30 F.2d 234 (ad Cir. 1929).
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panded concepts of the police power, seems unlikely to receive either
legislative or judicial approval. Less stringent state action, however,
particularly the escheat proposals drafted especially to embrace the
stamp operation, may ultimately have a restrictive effect upon the stamp
industry.
